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Dissatisfied with a criminal justice system apparently viewed
as unfairly favoring the rights of accused criminals at the expense
of victims and taxpayers, a majority of Californians voted on June
5, 1990 to adopt the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act
(Proposition 115).1 Proposition 115 was designed to improve the

1. The voters' dissatisfaction can be inferred by the voters' approval of the initiative, which
included a preamble stating:
(a) We the people of the State of California hereby find that the rights of crime
victims are too often ignored by our courts and by our State Legislature, that the death
penalty is a deterrent to murder, and that comprehensive reforms are needed in order to
restore balance and fairness to our criminal justice system.
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criminal prosecution system by promoting swift and fair justice.2
As part of the plan to achieve these goals, Chapter 10 was added
to the California Penal Code.3 This Chapter establishes a reciprocal
discovery scheme,4 and defines new parameters of permissible
discovery in criminal trials.5 The stated purpose of the new

discovery provisions is to promote the ascertainment of truth, to
save court time, and to protect victims of crimes from danger,

harassment, and undue delay.6 Arguably the most significant and
controversial portion of Chapter 10 is the enactment of California
Penal Code section 1054.3. This section mandates that, upon the

(b) In order to address these concerns and to accomplish these goals, we the people
further find that it is necessary to reform the law as developed in numerous California
Supreme Court decisions and as set forth in the statutes of this state. These decisions and
statutes have unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond that which
is required by the United States Constitution, thereby unnecessarily adding to the costs
of criminal cases, and diverting the judicial process from its function as a quest for truth.
(c) The goals of the people in enacting this measure are to restore balance to our
criminal justice system, to create a system in which justice is swift and fair, and to create
a system in which violent criminals receive just punishment, in which crime victims and
witnesses are treated with care and respect, and in which society as a whole can be free
from the fear of crime in our homes, neighborhoods, and schools.
(d) With these goals in mind, we the people do hereby enact the Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act.
Preamble ofProposedLaw, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 33 (June 5, 1990), reprintedin CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 14.1, note (Deerings Supp. 1992). Proposition 115 was passed by a 57 percent to 43
percent vote. L.A. Times, June 6, 1990, at A25, col. 2. See generally Proposition115: The Crime
ictims Justice Reform Act, 22 PAC. L J. 1010 (1991) (reviewing Proposition 115).
2. Preamble of Proposed Law, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 33 (June 5, 1990),
reprinted in CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.1, note (Deerings Supp. 1992).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1992) (enacted by Proposition 115)
(constituting Chapter 10).
4. Reciprocal discovery refers to a scheme of criminal discovery whereby both the
prosecution and the defense are given, within constitutional limitations, equal access to information
held by the opposition. 2 W. LAFAVE & . ISRAEL, CRumNAL PROCmURE: CRM AL PRACTICE
SERIEs § 19.4(a) (1984). While few courts disagree with the general policies behind reciprocal
discovery, there is often disagreement as to the extent to which a defendant's constitutional rights
prohibit full reciprocity in discovery by the prosecution. Id Courts also disagree as to the amount
of reciprocity that can be allowed without disrupting the traditional adversarial balance in a criminal
trial. L Compare, e.g., Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85
Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970) (providing a narrow interpretation of the prosecution's reciprocal
discovery rights) with State ex. rel. Keller v. Criminal Court, 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E.2d 433, 438
(1974) (providing a broad interpretation of the prosecution's reciprocal discovery rights).
5. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1992) (providing the rules for
discovery in criminal trials).
6. Id § 1054(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1992).
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prosecutor's request, a defendant and defense counsel must disclose
the names and addresses of witnesses, other than the defendant,
whom the defense intends to call at trial. 7 Section 1054.3 also
mandates the disclosure of these witnesses' statements, and any
reports or real evidence which are intended to be offered at trial.8
The effect of section 1054.3 is to provide prosecutors with avenues
of discovery which had previously been ruled impermissible by the
California Supreme Court.9 Additionally, the Chapter 10 discovery
rules provide for the exclusion of evidence if a party fails to
comply with the required discovery." °
The enactment of Chapter 10 dramatically reversed California
law governing the scope of prosecutorial discovery. I" The
discovery provisions within the Chapter, however, are
representative of rules previously adopted in other jurisdictions. 2
Moreover, many of these individual rules have previously faced
and survived federal constitutional challenges in their respective
jurisdictions. 3 Although the drafters of Proposition 115 appear to
have been cognizant of these previous challenges, and took pains

7. Id § 10543 (West Supp. 1992).
8. Id
9. See infra notes 132-189 and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme Court
decisions limiting the scope of prosecutorial discovery).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(c) (West Supp. 1992). The exclusion of testimony is a
sanction that can be used only after all other sanctions have been exhausted. Id
11. See infra notes 132-189 and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme Court
decisions limiting the scope of prosecutorial discovery).
12. See, e.g., ARiZ. R. CRim. P. 15.2; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 413 (Smith-Hurd
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.835 (1990) (permitting prosecutorial discovery of intended defenses,
names, addresses, and statements of witnesses intended to be called at trial, and real evidence
intended to be introduced at trial). See also, e.g., FLA. 1. CRIM. P. 3.200; MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
.§§ 768.20 (West 1982) (permitting prosecutorial discovery of any alibi defense, and the names and
addresses of alibi witnesses intended to be called at trial).
13. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1988), reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 983
(1988) (upholding the sanction of exclusion of evidence where a defendant fails to comply with a
state discovery rule); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 (1970) (upholding a discovery rule
requiring a defendant to disclose alibi defenses). But see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472
(1973) (striking down a discovery rule because the rule failed to provide for reciprocity by the
prosecution).
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to conform the California rules to federal precedent,14 at least one
commentator predicted that a challenge to the new rules would
quickly follow their adoption.15 The case of Izazaga v. Superior
Court6 was the realization of that prediction.
This Note reviews the scope and validity of reciprocal
discovery in California criminal proceedings in the wake of the
Izazaga decision. Part I discusses the primary constitutional issues
raised by prosecutorial discovery, and the legal background of
prosecutorial discovery in California.17 Part II summarizes the
California Supreme Court's disposition of the state and federal
constitutional issues raised in the Izazaga case.18 Finally, Part Ill
discusses the legal ramifications of the Izazaga decision and the
future validity of reciprocal discovery in California. 9
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Rival Notions of the ProperAdversarial Balance in Criminal
Trials
The degree to which courts and commentators justify or reject
the legitimacy of reciprocal discovery in criminal proceedings
depends largely on their view of the respective rights of the state

14. The drafters specifically limited the prosecution's discovery to witnesses and evidence that
the defendant intends to introduce at trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992). The
"Intends to introduce" limitation mirrors the language of the Florida discovery statute in Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), which was upheld as permissibly accelerating the timing of the
defendant's disclosure. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85. See Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 398,
815 P.2d 304, 333, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231,260 (1991) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating that the drafters of
Proposition 115 evidently included the concept of reciprocity because of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973)).
15. See Uelmen, Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L.
RPev. 2069, 2071 (1988) (predicting that the next state-wide ballot would contain the most far
reaching criminal justice initiative in California history, and also that the initiative if enacted would
be challenged in the California Supreme Court before November 1990).
16. 54 Cal. 3d 356,815 P.2d 304,285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991), modified, reh'g denied 54 Cal.
3d 611a (1991).
17. See infra notes 20-212 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 213-413 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 414-580 and accompanying text.
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and the accused to a fair trial.2" The notion that an accused
possesses a fundamental right to a fair trial arises from the
enumeration of an accused's trial-related rights in the United States
Constitution.2 1 The notion that a state also possesses a right to a
fair trial was developed by the United States Supreme Court in
Hayes v. Missouri.' As a result of our adversarial system of
justice, specific rules of procedure, such as those defining the scope
of permissible discovery, often place the rights of the state and the
accused in conflict.23 In order to justify particular rules despite the
conflict they create, several legal theories have been developed
which explain the purpose and proper functioning of a criminal

20. While the rights of the state and the accused are the primary factors balanced in
determining fair trial procedures, the rights of victims should not be ignored. See Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983) (arguing that the interests of crime victims should be placed in the balance).
See also Victims' Rights Symposium, 23 PAC. LJ. 815 (1992); Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's
Rights, 37 STAN. L REv. 937, 948 (1985) (discussing the concept of victims' rights).
21. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V, VI (enumerating the constitutional rights of a criminal
defendant). The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, the right
to confront witnesses against him, the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and the
right to assistance of counsel. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI. Trial-related rights of an accused are also
found in the fifth amendment, including the privileges against self-incrimination, the requirement of
grand jury indictment, and the prohibition against double jeopardy. Il amend. V. With the exception
of the grand jury indictment, all of these rights have been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment, and are therefore applicable to the states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
(holding that indictment by a grand jury is not a fundamental right which the states must respect).
For cases discussing rights incorporated under the fourteenth amendment see Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (prohibition against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(right to trial by jury); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process and right to public trial);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1

(1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel).
22. 120 U.S. 68 (1887). The Court in Hayes, dealing with an issue ofjuror impartiality, stated
that a criminal trial requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also freedom
from any prejudice against the state. Id at 70. The Court also stated that between the accused and
the state, the scales are to be evenly balanced. Id Butsee Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously:
The State's Right To A Fair Trial,60 S. CAL. L REv. 1019, 1024 (1987) (stating that the notion of
equality between the state and the accused in a criminal trial developed from dictum in Hayes, and
is highly questionable). Apparently a majority of California voters believe that the state has a right
to a fair trial. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29 (enacted by Proposition 115) (stating that in criminal
cases, the state shall have a right to due process of the law and to a speedy and public trial).
23. See Goodpaster, On the Theory ofAmerican Adversary CriminalTrial, 78 J. CRlM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121 (1987) (discussing the adversarial nature of a criminal trial in the United
States).
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trial.24 The two most common theories have been referred to as
the Search for Truth Model' and the Fair Play Model.26
It is almost universally agreed that the ultimate goal of a
criminal trial should be the attainment of truth.27 Those adhering
to the search for truth model believe that the truth may be
discovered only when all relevant evidence is accessible to both
parties. 2' This gives each party the fullest opportunity to prepare
its case, and avoids unfair surprise and trickery which can obscure
the truth. 29 A search for truth approach was followed by the
United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida,30 where a
statute requiring the pretrial disclosure of alibi defenses was upheld
in the face of the defendant's claim of due process and selfincrimination violations.31 In a statement representative of the
search for truth model, the Williams Court noted that the adversary
system is not a "poker game," rather, the pursuit of truth is
enhanced by giving each party equal access to the other's
information.32 It follows that proponents of the search for truth
model tend to favor liberal rules of discovery, much like those
applicable in civil trials.33

24. See id at 121-154 (identifying six different theories explaining the essential purpose of
a criminal trial).
25. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1036-45 (labeling and describing the Search for Truth
Model).
26. See id (labeling and describing the Fair Play Model).
27. Lapides, Cross-Currentsin ProsecutorialDiscovery:A Defense Counsel's Viewpoint, 7
U.S.F. L.REV. 217, 230 (1973); Kane, Criminal Discovery-The Circuitous Road to a Two-Way
Street, 7 U.S.F. L REv. 203, 203 (1973); Traynor, Ground Lost andFound in Criminal Discovery,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 228 (1964).
28. See Traynor, supra note 27, at 228. Such a position is widely accepted in civil cases as
the most effective way of attaining the truth. ld.
29. Id
30. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
31. Il at 81-86. The Williams Court held that due process was not violated since the statute
was narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate state interest of advance disclosure. Ia at 81-82. The
Court also held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not violated since the statute merely
accelerated the disclosure of information which would eventually come out at the trial. Il at 83-86.
32. IL at 82. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (stating that the ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgment were to be founded on partial or speculative
presentation of the facts).
33. See Traynor, supra note 27, at 228.
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In contrast, proponents of the fair play model believe the
ultimate goal of finding the truth, if possible at all,' 4 can only be
achieved by providing sufficient advantages and protections to the
accused.35 Such advantages are necessary because, unlike a civil
trial, a criminal trial necessarily places the defendant at a
disadvantage.36 The dissenting opinion of Justice Black in
Williams illustrates the view that the prosecution and defense
cannot be treated as equals, because the defendant enters a criminal
37
proceeding at a disadvantage to the superior power of the state.
For example, the state controls the initiation of a proceeding with
its powers of indictment, and has theoretically limitless
investigative powers." Therefore, a fair criminal trial must have
an asymmetric shape.3 9 The rights of the accused must be greater
than those of the state in order to counterbalance the state's

34. See Goodpaster,supra note 23, at 125 (stating that under the strictest fair play theory, the
goal of a trial is not the search for the actual truth, rather it is simply a means of resolving a dispute,
and should be as fair as possible). It has been suggested that if discovering the actual truth is the goal
of a criminal trial, the adversarial system is not an effective means to achieve this goal. Id. Rather,
an inquisitorial or investigative system would be a more efficient means for discovering the truth. 1d
35. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 112-14 (Black, L, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the disadvantages of an accused should not be ignored in the quest for truth). See also
Blumenson, ConstitutionalLimitationson ProsecutorialDiscovery,18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 123,
133 (1983) (arguing that a strict search for truth approach conflicts with the Bill of Rights, which was
designed to redress the inherent disadvantages of an accused in a government prosecution); Arenella,
Rethinking the Function of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Court's Competing
Ideologies, 72 Gao. LJ. 185, 198 (1983) (claiming that characterizing the primary function of a
criminal trial as the search for truth oversimplifies how the system is designed to determine guilt, and
is therefore misleading).
36. Williams, 399 U.S. at 112-14 (Black, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that a defendant
enters a criminal trial at a disadvantage).
37. Wlliams, 399 U.S. at 112-14 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
Wardius, 412 U.S. at 480 (Douglas, 3., concurring) (stating that the framers of the Constitution
recognized the awesome power of the indictment and the virtually limitless resources of government
investigators).
38. Wii/!ams, 399 U.S. at 112-14 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
Wardius, 412 U.S. at 480 (Douglas, J., concurring) (identifying the power to indict and to conduct
exhaustive investigation as advantages of the state). See also Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under
ProposedRule 16, 85 HARe. L. REV. 994, 1018-19 (1972) (identifying other advantages held by the
state including the ability to begin its investigation long before the defendant when witnesses are
more likely to remember events, access to a great wealth of information in government files, and the
fact that persons may be more willing to cooperate with the prosecution than with the defense).
39. Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 126 (explaining the underlying theory of the fair play
approach).
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inherent advantages.' Proponents of the fair play model believe
that a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
a jury trial, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
limited prosecutorial discovery are necessary advantages even if
they have the practical effect of hindering the attainment of
41
truth.
Belief in one or the other of these rival models largely explains
how courts and commentators arrive at contrary conclusions with
respect to the constitutional validity of reciprocal discovery in the
criminal setting. Proponents of the fair play model claim that
discovery by the prosecution may violate a defendant's selfincrimination privilege, due process rights, or work product and
effective assistance of counsel protections.42 Proponents of the
search for truth model on the other hand, more narrowly define
these rights and protections so that prosecutorial discovery can
exist without impairing a defendant's constitutional rights.43
B. Federal Constitutional Issues Raised By
Discovery

Prosecutorial

1. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The United States Constitution grants no general right to
discovery," and the common law generally prohibited discovery
in criminal trials.45 The concept of fairness, however, eventually

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1032 (stating that a defendant's constitutional rights are at
the foundation of a fair play approach, and that this approach embodies the concept that a defendant

is under no obligation to aid the state in making its case).
43. See Loulsell, CriminalDiscovery and Self-Incrimination:Roger Traynor Confronts the
Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L Rav. 89, 91-95 (1965) (explaining the search for truth approach taken by
Justice Traynor in Jones v. SuperiorCourt, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919,22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962)).
44. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
45. See People ex reL Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 32-34, 156 N.E. 84, 86-87
(1927) (adhering to the English common law prohibition on discovery in ruling that a court lacked
power to grant discovery in the absence of legislative authority). The basis for the English common
law prohibition was the case of Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). Moore, Criminal
Discovery, 19 HAsTrINGs U,. 865, 866 (1968).
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led courts in this century to permit discovery by the defendant.46
This discovery was permitted in the absence of a substantial
contrary governmental interest, such as the need to keep certain law
enforcement information confidential.47 Discovery by the
prosecution did not, however, immediately follow.48 The
reluctance to allow prosecutorial discovery probably grew out of
the ruling in Boyd v. United States,49 where the scope of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was defined broadly
to protect both testimonial and physical evidence.5" The United
States Supreme Court in Boyd held that any state action that
compelled a defendant's oath or the production of the defendant's
private books and papers was contrary to the principles of a free
government.51
By 1966, the Supreme Court began to limit the broad scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination.52 Contrary to the position
in Boyd that the privilege included both testimonial and physical
evidence,53 the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California54 held
that the privilege applied only to testimonial evidence. 55 In
Schmerber, where the defendant was required to give an
incriminating blood sample, the Court held that compulsion which
makes the defendant the source of real or physical evidence does
not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 56 Subsequently,

46. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959); People v. Riser, 47
Cal. 2d 566,305 P.2d 1 (1956), (departing from the common law prohibition and allowing discovery
by the defendant) cert denie4 Riser v. California, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).
47. See Riser,47 Cal. 2d at 586,305 P.2d at 13 (stating that discovery was permissible in the
absence of a substantial governmental interest).
48. See Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the AdversarialBalance, 74 CALF.
L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1986) (indicating that prosecutorial discovery developed after discovery by the
defense because of a perceived imbalance created by providing the defense with a right to pretrial
discovery).
49. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
50. Id at 631-32. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1974) (indicating that the
reluctance to permit prosecutorial discovery resulted from the Boyd decision).
51. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32.
52. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,764 (1966) (limiting the privilege against selfincrimination to testimonial evidence).
53. Boyd 116 U.S. at 631-32.
54. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

55.

Id. at 764.

56.

Id
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the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the privilege is not triggered
by the compelled disclosure of private information; rather it is
triggered by the testimonial content of the evidence and the
testimonial communications associated with the act of
production.
The Court has further limited the broad definition of the
privilege against self-incrimination annunciated in Boyd by holding
that the privilege applies only to the personal testimony of a
defendant.58 In Fisher v. United States,59 the Internal Revenue
Service sought discovery of the workpapers of an accountant who
had prepared the defendant's tax returns.60 The Supreme Court,
after explaining that Boyd had since been rejected, found the
discovery constitutional, and stated that the privilege against selfincrimination applies only to information which is intimate and
personal to the defendant. 61 The information must be the
defendant's own testimonial communication.62 Even though the
accountant's workpapers undoubtedly contained a great deal of raw
data that came directly from the defendant, it was not sufficient to
transform the papers into the personal communications of the
defendant.63 The Fisher Court also noted that there may be cases
where the act of production itself could be testimonial. 64 In the
Fisher case, however, merely acknowledging possession and
producing the workpapers was not incriminating.65
In light of the narrower definition of the privilege against selfincrimination established in Fisher, the United States Supreme

57.
58.
59.

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-408 (1976).
Id at 397-98.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).

60.

lId at 394.

61.
62.
63:

kd at 405-09.
Id
Id. at 394.

64.

Id at 410-11. The Court indicated that if, in the act of production, the defendant was

forced to restate or affirm the truth of the contents of the materials produced, the production might

meet the testimonial requirement. Id at 409.
65. Id at 410-11. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) (holding that the act
of handing over the statements of defense witnesses to the prosecution does not implicate the
privilege because it does not reveal the defendant's knowledge of facts relating to the offense, nor
does it require the defendant to share his or her thoughts and beliefs with the government).

1731

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
Court held in United States v. Nobles' that a defendant could
constitutionally be compelled to disclose the statements of thirdparty witnesses. 67 The Nobles Court explained that the privilege
adheres to the defendant's personal statements, and not necessarily
to all information that may incriminate the defendant. 68
Not only must the information disclosed be the personal
testimony of the defendant, it must be compelled by the state in
order for the privilege to apply.' The predominant case dealing
with the issue of compulsion in the area of criminal discovery is
7" In Williams, a Florida statute required a
Williams v. Florida.
criminal defendant to disclose the defendant's intention to utilize
an alibi defense, as well as the names and locations of any alibi
witnesses who were intended to be called at trial.7 1 The defendant
in Williams complied with the required discovery, and was
convicted after the deposition of a disclosed witness was
successfully used to impeach that witness. 2 The United States
Supreme Court held that Florida's discovery statute did not violate
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.73 Since the
statute required only the disclosure of witnesses who were intended
to later testify at trial, and since the privilege would be waived
when they did testify, the discovery provision merely accelerated
the timing of the disclosure.74 The Court's reasoning indicated
that because the defendant was required only to disclose
information intended to be introduced at trial, a waiver of the
defendant's fifth amendment privilege could be implied.75
Prior to the Court's decision in Williams, at least one authority
argued that this acceleration is impermissible because it forces a

66.

422 U.S. 225 (1975).

67.

Id at 234.

68.
69.

Id at 233 (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)).
Fisher,425 U.S. at 386-97. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (stating that no person shall be

compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself).
70. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
71. Id at 79.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id at 80-81.
Id at 85.
Id
See id (utilizing reasoning which indicated a theory of implied waiver supported the

constitutionality of the Florida statute).
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defendant to decide whether or not to utilize a specific witness
before the prosecution presents its case.76 However, the Supreme
Court rejected this argument in Williams by stating that nothing in
the fifth amendment privilege entitles a defendant to await the end
of the prosecution's case before announcing the nature of the
defendant's defense.77 The Williams Court contended that
allowing such a right would be akin to permitting a defendant to
await the jury's verdict on the prosecution's case before deciding
whether or not to take the stand. 8
While the decision in Williams rested on the theory of
accelerated disclosure and implied waiver, it has been suggested
that limits on the privilege against self-incrimination, imposed by
permitting prosecutorial discovery, might be constitutional even in
the absence of a waiver by the defendant.79 This suggestion is
supported by the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
often determined the constitutionality of state procedural rules by
evaluating the burdens placed on a defendant's exercise of the fifth
amendment privilege in light of the policies underlying the
privilege.8 "
For example, in McGautha v. California1 the Supreme Court
found no fifth amendment violation in the state's utilization of a

76. See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962)
(Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
77. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85. Although the Supreme Court in Williams found the acceleration
of alibi defense information constitutional, the Court has not validated every rule of criminal
procedure on similar grounds. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605,606-12 (1972). In Brooks, the
Court struck down a state rule which provided that if a defendant was to testify, the defendant was
required to testify before any other defense witnesses or not at all. l The Court addressed the
argument that the rule was a legitimate means to prevent perjury by insuring that a defendant did not
tailor his or her testimony to fit the testimony of other witness. Id at 611. By implication, the Court
rejected any acceleration argument by stating that pressuring the defendant to testify before the
defendant had a chance to evaluate the strength of the other evidence was not a constitutional means
of preventing perjury. Id at 611-12.
78. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85.
79. See Deitzler, ProsecutorialDiscovery: An Overview, 83 W. VA. L REV. 187, 192-93
(1980) (stating that even in the absence of a defendant's waiver, the privilege against selfincrimination may be limited).
80. For cases utilizing this approach see Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied,406 U.S. 978 (1972); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957).
81. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972).
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unitary proceeding for determining guilt and punishment in a
capital case.82 The defendant in McGautha argued that this
procedure created an unconstitutional conflict between his privilege
to remain silent with respect to the question of guilt, and his right
to testify with respect to the question of punishment.8 3 The Court
recognized that the defendant had a constitutional right to choose
between remaining silent or testifying, but held that the
Constitution does not prohibit the state from forcing him to make
that choice applicable to both the guilt and penalty phases of his
trial.8 4 Rather, the compulsion to make a choice would only be
unconstitutional if the compulsion appreciably impaired the policies
behind the rights involved.8" The McGautha Court reasoned that
the defendant's choice under the unitary procedure was analogous
to the choice any defendant must make in deciding to take the
stand or not, and therefore the compulsion of that choice did not to
any appreciable extent impair the defendant's constitutional
rights.86

Whether the Supreme Court will continue to narrow the
privilege against self-incrimination with respect to prosecutorial
discovery in the future is, of course, unknown. It is clear today,
however, that there are four requirements that together trigger a
defendant's fifth amendment privilege. First, the information sought
by discovery must be incriminating.87 Second, the information
must be personal to the defendant. 8 Third, the information must
be testimonial.8 9 Finally, the information must be obtained by
unjustifiable compulsion."

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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Id at 213.
d. at 210-11.
Id. at 213-17.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 216-17.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
Fisher,425 U.S. at 409.
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2. Due Process of Law
Discovery by the prosecution has also been challenged as
violative of a defendant's right to due process of law.91 However,
the notion that prosecutorial discovery inherently violates due
process has been uniformly rejected by the United States Supreme
Court.' In Williams, the Court upheld an alibi discovery rule in
the face of both a self-incrimination and a due process
challenge.9 The Court justified its due process holding by
pointing out that Florida had a legitimate interest in preventing
fabricated defenses.9 4 Further, the alibi disclosure rule was fairly

constructed to achieve the state's interest.95 The Williams Court
stated that the adversarial trial is not an end in itself, and neither
the defense nor the prosecution has an absolute right to conceal
their strategy for presenting evidence.' The Court noted that the
Florida rule provided the defendant with the right to reciprocal
discovery of information held by the prosecution.97 Therefore, as
far as due process was concerned, there was ample room for the
discovery statute, which was designed to enhance the search for
truth by giving each party full opportunity to investigate crucial
facts in the case.98

In the absence of such reciprocity, however, the Supreme Court
has held that prosecutorial discovery violates the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment." In Wardius v. Oregon, " a state
statute required the defendant to disclose any alibi defenses, and
the alibi witnesses intended to be called at trial.1 ' Unlike the

91.

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472-74

(1973).
92.
precludes
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See, e.g., Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474 (stating that nothing in the due process clause
a state from experimenting with systems of broad discovery).
Wiliams, 399 U.S. at 79-86.
Id at 81.
Id at 81-82.
Id at 82-84.
Id at 81.
Id at 82.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
412 U.S. 470 (1973).
Id at 471.
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statute in Williams, however, the prosecution had no duty to
reciprocate." ° This lack of reciprocity led the Supreme Court to
find the statute violative of the defendant's due process rights."0 3
The Wardius Court explained that the breadth of the mandated
discovery does not implicate a due process violation." 4 Rather,
it is the balance of forces between the state and the accused that
determines if a specific discovery rule fails to ensure due process
of law."0 5 If a statute creates an imbalance in the discovery rights
of the parties, that imbalance must work in the defendant's
favor.106
Although both Williams and Wardius dealt with alibi defense
discovery, the language used by the Supreme Court indicates that
broader aspects of prosecutorial discovery may also meet the
demands of due process, so long as sufficient reciprocity
exists.'0 7 It seems clear that due process protection does not
prevent discovery by the prosecution.' 8 Due process merely
requires a fair balance of discovery between the parties."°9

102. Id, Even after the defendant disclosed his alibi evidence, the prosecution could not be
required to disclose the names and addresses it planned to use to refute the defendant's alibi. Id. at
474-75. In contrast, the Florida discovery scheme required the prosecution to disclose the names and
addresses of rebuttal witnesses within five days of the defendant's disclosure. Williams, 399 U.S. at
104.
103. Wardus, 412 U.S. at 472.
104. Id. at 474. It should be noted that due process does specifically defime the scope of one
aspect of criminal discovery. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant's due
process rights are violated if the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence which is material
to the question of guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See generally
Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of ProsecutorlalDiscretion
and Retrospective Review, 53 FoRDHAm L. REv. 391 (1984) (discussing the prosecutor's duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence).
105. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474.
106. Id at 475 n.9.
107. The Court in Wardius stated that the growth of state notice-of-alibi rules was based on
the theory that justice was best served by a system of liberal discovery. Id at 473. Further, the
growth of such discovery devices was a positive development, enhancing the fairness of the
adversarial system. id at 474.
108. This conclusion is strongly supported by Williams and Wardius,and is also supported by
state court decisions striking down prosecutorial discovery as a violation of the privilege against selfincrimination, which do not find any violation of due process. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774,
777-78 (Alaska 1974) (holding that most discovery by the prosecution would violate the state
privilege against self-incrimination, but indicating that such discovery would not violate due process
rights).
109. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474.

1736

1992 / Izazaga v. Superior Court
3. Work Product Protection
The United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor110

created the protection against forced disclosure of an attorney's
work product."' Work product refers generally to the materials
prepared by an attorney or an attorney's agent in anticipation of

litigation, and includes recorded interviews and statements, briefs,
memoranda, and correspondence."1 2 Work product is subdivided

as either ordinary work product or core work product." 3 Core
work product refers to those materials which contain the mental

impressions or legal theories of the attorney.' The Hickman
Court held that ordinary work product retains a qualified immunity
from pretrial discovery in civil cases.' 15 These ordinary work
product materials are only discoverable upon a showing of
necessity by the moving party." 6 On the other hand, core work
product retains an almost absolute privilege against discovery." 7

110.

329 U.S. 495 (1947).
adatSO-13.
112. Ra at 510-11. The work product doctrine created in Hickman has been codified in the
federal system. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (providing for limited work product protection). In
California, work product protection is also codified. See CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 2018(c) (West
Supp. 1992) (providing for absolute work product protection).
113. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-12. Although the Hickman Court distinguished the two types
of work product, the Court did not use the term "core" to describe work product containing an
attorney's mental impressions and opinions. ladThis term was used by the Supreme Court in Nobles.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
114. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512; Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238.
115. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510.
116. The Hickman Court did not specifically define what would constitute a sufficient showing
of necessity in order to overcome work product protection, but judicial decisions have defined the
required necessity. See Beesley v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 205, 208, 373 P.2d 454, 456, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 390, 392 (1962) (holding that better and more timely access to witnesses can be enough to
permit the discovery of ordinary work product in civil cases). The discovery of ordinary work product
may be permitted where the party seeking discovery can show special circumstances, such as an
inability to access the materials sought without undue hardship. 2 HOGAN, MODERN CAL. DIscOvERY
§ 13.8, at 231 (4th ed. 1988).
117. In Hickman, the Supreme Court indicated that core work product would be discoverable
only in rare cases. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401
(1981) (holding that work product may not be discovered merely by making a showing of substantial
need or undue hardship in obtaining the materials sought to be discovered). The Upjohn Court did
not, however, articulate what standard should be used to determine when, if ever, work product could
be discovered. Id. Some lower courts have been unwilling to grant core work product absolute
protection from discovery. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,1200

111.
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The Hickman Court indicated that these levels of work product
protection were essential in our adversarial system of justice.'18
Although the work product doctrine was created in a civil
context, it has been applied to criminal trials as well." 9 In United
States v. Noblest2 the Supreme Court stated that despite the fact
that the work product doctrine is most frequently asserted as a bar
to discovery in civil trials, it has an even more vital role in
maintaining the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system.'21 Consistent with this view, Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure contains a work product rule which
prohibits the discovery of reports, memoranda, witness statements,
and other internal documents prepared by an attorney or an
attorney's agent in conjunction with the investigation, prosecution,
or defense of a criminal case.' Additionally, most states have
adopted work product rules that provide similar protection in state
criminal proceedings. 2 ' A majority of these states, however, limit
the protection to work product which contains the mental
impressions or opinions of an attorney. 24

(D.S.C. 1974); Xerox v. IBM, 64 F.R.D. 367,381 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (rejecting absolute work product
protection). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that lower courts are in disagreement
over the showing required to overcome core work product protection, but the Court has failed to
provide a conclusive test. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981). The Court would
only go so far as to say that core work product was entitled to "'special protection." Ma In California,
core work product appears to have an absolute protection against discovery. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 2018(c) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that -[a]ny writing that reflects an attorney's
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories shall not be discoverable under any
circumstances"). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (stating that "the court shall protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation").
118. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-12.
119. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975); People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43,
59, 634 P.2d 534, 543, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 467 (1981) (stating that work product protection applies
in criminal as well as civil cases).
120. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
121. Id. at 238.
122. See FED. R. CIuM. P. 16 (defining the extent of work product protection).
123. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212 (1975); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 723 (West
1980); DEL. R. CFRM. P. 16(b); VA. R. CRIM. P. 319:14(a)(2).
124. See, e.g., FLA. R. CuM. P. 3.220(c); MAss. R. CRIM. P. 14(5); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25-10(A).
In California, both the defense and prosecution are provided with work product protection as defined
in section 2018(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.6 (West
Supp. 1992).
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Despite the fact that Rule 16 appears to provide absolute
protection for work product, the privilege has been limited by the
United States Supreme Court.'2 For instance, in Nobles the Court
held that the application of Rule 16 was limited to discovery
conducted before trial. 26 At issue in Nobles was whether or not
the prosecution was entitled to review the reports of a defense
investigator called by the defense to testify as to the contents of his
reports.127 The Supreme Court noted that the privilege protecting
work product from disclosure is a qualified privilege and can be
waived.22 The Nobles Court concluded that by taking the stand
and testifying about the contents of the reports, the defense had
waived any work product privilege. 9
Since the Nobles Court disposed of the work product issue on
the grounds of waiver, the Court did not expressly rule on the
defendant's contention that discovery of work product violated his
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.13
Although the Court expressed doubt that discovery of work product
implicated a violation of the sixth amendment, the issue remains
unresolved. 3 '

125. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 235 (holding that Rule 16 applies only to pretrial discovery).
126. Id.
127. Ia at 231-32.
l The Court stated that what constitutes a waiver will depend on the circumstances. Id
128.
at 239 n.14. Counsel will necessarily rely upon work product materials throughout the trial in
preparing the case and in examining the witnesses, and such use would not normally constitute a
waiver. Id But, where counsel seeks to make a testimonial use of the information, the normal rule
of evidence would dictate the production of the work product. Ia
129. Id at 239.
130.
l at 240 n.15.

131.

Id Compare Pulasld, Exiending the Disclosure Requirements of the Jencks Act to

Defendants: ConstitutionalorNonconstitutionalConsiderations,64 IOWA L REV. 1 (1978) (arguing
that work product should be considered a constitutional privilege) with Feldman, The Work Product
Rule in CriminalPracticeandProcedure,50 U. CIN. L. RE v. 495 (1981) (arguing that work product
should not be considered a constitutional privilege).
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C. The Development of ProsecutorialDiscovery in California
Discovery in California criminal proceedings was originally a
creation of the courts. 3 2 Due to an absence of legislative
authority, the power to order discovery was primarily vested in the
discretion of the trial judge."3 Over the past three decades,
however, the California Supreme Court has taken widely disparate
positions as to the permissible scope of discovery, especially with
respect to discovery by the prosecution.13 4 Moreover, the
California Supreme Court has often cited legislative action as the
panacea for the contrasting discovery orders issued by trial
5
13

courts.

The California Supreme Court's initial decision addressing the
constitutionality of prosecutorial discovery was Jones v. Superior
Court.136 As noted above, the common law originally prohibited
discovery, and the development of defense discovery did not
137
immediately spark the development of prosecutorial discovery.
For the first time in California, the Jones court stated that
discovery should not be a "one-way street. ' ' 138 The defendant in

132. B.E. WyciN, CAL ONm CRMAL PRocEDuRE § 271, at 265 (1963). See People v.
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566,305 P.2d 1 (1956), (rejecting, for the first time in California, the common law
prohibition against discovery in criminal trials) cert denie4 353 U.S. 930 (1957). See also Castiel
v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 2d 710, 328 P.2d 476 (1958) (allowing pretrial discovery of the
identity of informers); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957) (holding that
a defendant has a right to pretrial inspection of documents containing confessions or admissions).
133. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 4, § 19.3(b).
134. Compare Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56,58-59,372 P.2d 919,920,22 Cal. Rptr.
879,880 (1962) (permitting broad prosecutorial discovery) with Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970) (defining the scope of permissible
prosecutorial discovery very narrowly). See also Kane, supra note 27, at 205-10 (identifying the
inconsistent positions taken by California courts with respect to discovery by the prosecution).
135. See, e.g., People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43,55,634 P.2d 534,541, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 465
(1981) (going so far as to rule that because of the complexity of constitutional issues surrounding
prosecutorial discovery, trial courts could not order such discovery in the absence of enabling
legislation).
136. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
137. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing the common law prohibition
on discovery).
138. Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881. Although Jones was
California's landmark embarkment into prosecutorial discovery, fourteen other states had
experimented with such discovery in the form of notice-of-alibi rules between 1927 and 1942.
Mosteller, supra note 48, at 1574 n.16. These alibi rules, which were the first form of prosecutorial
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Jones, who was charged with committing rape, challenged a
discovery order which required the pretrial disclosure of
information supporting his defense of impotence. 139 Despite
ultimately prohibiting enforcement of the order as issued, the Jones
court held that it was constitutionally permissible to compel pretrial
disclosure of the witnesses and evidence supporting the defendant's
impotence defense."4 The court noted that the witnesses the
defendant intended to call would necessarily be identified and
cross-examined during the trial.141 Any reports and medical
evidence would likewise be subject to study by the prosecution
when introduced.142 Therefore, pretrial disclosure of the same
information would only provide for a more efficient trial. 43 Since
this discovery did not compel the defendant to give any
information that the defendant would not voluntarily reveal at trial,
there could be no violation of the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination. 44 Writing for the majority in Jones, Justice
Traynor reasoned that in the interest of accuracy and efficiency,
and subject to the privilege against self-incrimination, neither the
defense nor the prosecution had any valid interest in denying
access to evidence which could shed light on issues in the
case.

145

After Jones, California courts quickly began embracing the idea
of discovery as a "two-way street," and in fact began expanding
the scope of prosecutorial discovery, to the point of allowing
discovery orders requiring the pretrial disclosure of all defense
witnesses and evidence intended to be introduced at trial.' 46 This

discovery, generally required a defendant to give notice of an intention to use an alibi defense, and
to provide specific information as to the defendant's location at the time of the crime and the names
and addresses of witnesses who would support the defense. Id
139. Jones 58 Cal. 2d at 57, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
140. Id at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
141. Id at 61, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id. at 59, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
146. See People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 605, 455 P.2d 776, 781, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677
(1969), (upholding an order which required the defense counsel to disclose the names and addresses
and expected testimony of the defense witnesses) cert. denied, Pike v. California, 406 U.S. 971
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expansion lasted only eight years. In the 1970 case of Prudhomme
v. Superior Court,4 7 the California Supreme Court halted any
expansion of prosecutorial discovery by imposing considerable
restrictions on its use.1 In fact, the court's holding in
Prudhomme was just short of completely rejecting the two-way
street theory of Jones.'4 9
The defendant in Prudhomme sought to enjoin the enforcement
of a discovery order in her pending murder trial."' 0 The order
required defense counsel to disclose the names, addresses, and
expected testimony of all witnesses intended to be called at
trial.' Citing several United States Supreme Court cases decided
after Jones,1 52 the Prudhomme court noted that a defendant's
constitutional privileges in state proceedings had been expanded

(1972); McGuire v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. App. 2d 583, 594, 79 Cal. Rptr. 155, 161 (1969)
(upholding a discovery order calling for all the witnesses and evidence that the defense intended to
introduce at trial); People v. Dugas, 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 249, 51 Cal. Rptr. 478, 481 (1966)
(upholding a discovery order granted before the defendant had indicated that he would attempt to
establish an affirmative defense); People v. Houser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 930, 936,48 Cal. Rptr. 300,
304 (1965) (upholding an order to produce a copy of a report prepared by a defense psychiatrist);
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 244, 384 P.2d 16, 28, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 436 (1963), (allowing
discovery of the names and addresses of intended alibi witnesses as well as their written statements)
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1965).
147. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
148. Id at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134. The supreme court's opinion in
Prudhommehas been fiercely criticized as stating erroneous fifth amendment law, and as misapplying
United States Supreme Court precedenL Craig v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 416, 424-31, 126
Cal. Rptr. 565, 568-73 (1976) (Elkington, J., concurring).
149. Prudhomme, 2 Cal. 3d at 327,466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Although the court
did not overrule Jones,the court criticized the decisions in Peoplev. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d
776,78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969), Peoplev. Dugas, 242 Cal. App. 2d 244,51 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966), and
McGuire v. SuperiorCourt, 274 Cal. App. 2d 583,79 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1969). Prudhomme, 2 Cal. 3d
at 327 n.11, 466 P.2d at 678 n.1l, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134 n.1l. Moreover, Justice Peters in his
concurrence specifically stated that both Jones and Pike should be overruled because the two-way
street theory of discovery ignores the fact that a defendant possesses constitutional rights which
exceed the rights of the prosecution. Id at 328, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (Peters, I.,
concurring).
150. Id at 322, 466 P.2d at 674, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
151. Id.
152. The Prudhomme court cited Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination into the fourteenth amendment, thereby binding state
courts to uphold the privilege), Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting the court or
prosecution from commenting on an accused's silence), and Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(broadening the application of the privilege against self-incrimination during the accusatory stage of
a case). Id at 323-24, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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since Jones by the incorporation of portions of the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment. 153 According to the court, this
expansion of individual rights indicated that greater emphasis must
be placed on the fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination."5 In light of these federal decisions, the
Prudhomme court reasoned that any expansion of the two-way
street theory would likely be a violation of a defendant's fifth
amendment rights as incorporated under the fourteenth
amendment. 155
In order to determine the scope of prosecutorial discovery that
would withstand federal constitutional scrutiny, the Prudhomme
court looked to the discovery provisions promulgated by the United
States Supreme Court in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 15 6 Using the federal rule as a guidepost, the
Prudhomme court found that a reasonable demand for factual
information that the defendant intends to introduce at trial might
not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.' 57 However,
the court added that discovery would be proper only if, on the
particular facts and circumstances of a case, the trial judge could
find that the disclosure could not possibly tend to incriminate the
defendant.158 The court held that the principle factor in
determining whether a particular request for discovery by the
prosecution should be allowed is whether the disclosure might

153. Ra at 323-24, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
154. IM
155. Id at 324, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The court stated that the United States
Supreme Court's increasing emphasis on the role played by the privilege against self-incrimination
was cause to reexamine the policies underlying prosecutorial discovery. Id Further support for a
reexamination was the fact that several commentators had concluded that the Jones decision not only
reached, but in fact had exceeded federal constitutional limits. Id at 324 n.7, 466 P.2d at 676 n.7,
85 Cal. Rptr. at 132 n.7.
156. Id at 324,466 P.2d at 675,85 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The court noted that Rule 16, which was
adopted in 1966, permitted only the discovery of scientific and medical reports, books, papers, and
other physical evidence. Id Further, such discovery was conditioned upon the discretion of the court
in finding the requested discovery reasonable and necessary. Id Requiring the discovery of the
names, addresses, and expected testimony of defense witnesses went beyond the scope of the
discovery allowable under Rule 16, which itself had been attacked as violating the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id
157. Id at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
158. Id
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conceivably lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case-inchief. 159 The Prudhomme court concluded that the discovery
order at issue might have served as a link in the chain of evidence
tending to establish guilt."6 Since the trial court had failed to
incriminatory effect, the order was void
inquire into the possible
161
and unenforceable.
In departing from the Jones precedent, the California Supreme
Court in Prudhomme stated that the Jones decision was based upon
the assumed constitutionality of state alibi statutes, 162 thus
indicating the court's belief that the United States Supreme Court
would soon strike down statutes allowing discovery of alibi
defenses and witnesses. "3 Just two months after the decision in
Prudhomme, however, the federal trend upon which the California
United
Supreme Court had relied was abruptly terminated by the
64
Florida.'
v.
Williams
in
decision
States Supreme Court's
In Williams, the Supreme Court upheld a Florida statute which
required the pretrial disclosure of alibi defenses and witnesses that
were intended to be introduced at trial."6 Since the defendant
was only required to disclose witnesses whom the defendant
intended to call at trial, the Court reasoned that the statute merely
accelerated the timing of disclosure from the time of trial to the
pretrial stage.' 6 Such an acceleration, the Court held, was not a
violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
since the information was not in fact compelled within the meaning

159. Id at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
160. Id at 327, 466 P.2d at 677-78, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
161. Id
162. Id at 324, 466 P.2d at 676, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
163. To support its contention that such statutes would soon be struck down by the United
States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court cited Cantillon v. Superior Court,305 F. Supp.
304 (C.D. Cal. 1969), where a discovery order calling for the disclosure of alibi witnesses was held
invalid. Id at 325, 466 P.2d at 676, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The court also noted that the United States
Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in the case of Williams v. State, 224 So.2d 406 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969), affd Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) which involved a challenge to
a statute permitting pretrial discovery of alibi defenses. Id
164. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
165. Id at 83.
166. Id at 85.
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of the fifth amendment.167 The Court's holding in Williams was
not only seen by state legislatures as an invitation 'to expand
prosecutorial discovery,1 it was stated to be such by the
Supreme Court itself in Wardius v. Oregon.1 9
Despite a national trend toward expanding discovery by the
prosecution in the wake of Williams, California courts were
unwilling to move away from the narrow interpretation of
permissible discovery established in Prudhomme.17 ° For example,
the First District Court of Appeals held in Rodriguez v. Superior
Court.71 that in the absence of the kind of statutorily required
discovery involved in Williams, the prosecution could not discover
the defense's alibi witnesses. 72 The Rodriguez court based its
refusal to allow discovery in the absence of statutory authority on
the doctrine of judicial abstention, 73 and noted that the California
Legislature had specifically refused to pass such legislation.174

167. Id at 85-86.
168. Between 1942 and 1970, only two states had adopted notice of alibi discovery rules, but
in the 14 years following Wiliams, 25 states adopted such rules. Mosteller, supra note 48, at 1577
n.25. Not only did states take to expanding prosecutorial discovery, the , l/iams decision influenced
the American Bar Association to approve far-reaching discovery provisions as part of its Standards
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial. See id, at 1577-78 & nn.26-32 (outlining the
adopted standards and discussing the influence of the Wiliams decision).
169. 412 U.S. 470,474 (1973). The Wardius Court described the Wiliams opinion as follows:
The growth of such discovery devices [notice of alibi provisions] is a salutary
development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the
fairness of the adversary system. As we recognized in Wi/iams, nothing in the Due
Process Clause precludes States from experimenting with systems of broad discovery
designed to achieve these goals.

Id
170. See In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543,558,698 P.2d 637,647-48,213 Cal. Rptr. 569,579-80
(1985); Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 527, 557 P.2d 65, 68, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 777
(1976); Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 850, 528 P.2d 45, 55, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 447
(1974); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 498-99, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154, 157 (1970)
(holding that discovery ordered by the trial court violated the standards of permissible prosecutorial
discovery established in Prudhomme).
171. 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1970).
172. rd at 497, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
173. The Rodriguez court stated that the doctrine of judicial abstention persuades courts not
only to refrain from declaring statutes invalid except for the most cogent reason, but also to decline
to adopt new and important procedural rules which the legislature has considered and rejected. Id
174. Id A statutory discovery plan had been proposed by the California Law Revision
Commission and considered by the legislature in 1961.3 CAL. LAW REVISION COM. REP. REc. &
STuDims pp. J-5 at J-21 (1961); A. B. 464, Reg. Sess. (1961). The plan, however, was ultimately
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In order to avoid a repeat of the Rodriguez holding, proponents
of reciprocal discovery attempted to pass legislation which would
expand the availability of such discovery.' 75 During the 1972
session of the California State Legislature, Assembly Bill 2128 and
Senate Bill 87 were introduced, which would have permitted
discovery of alibi defenses and witnesses, as well as the sanction
of exclusion of all alibi evidence in the event of
noncompliance. 7 6 These measures, however, never passed out of
the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, apparently because
of opposition from the California Public Defender's
77
Association.
In the absence of legislative authority sanctioning discovery by
the prosecution, California courts continued to follow the narrow
interpretation of permissible discovery laid down in
Prudhomme.17' The courts did so, however, on the theory that
more expansive prosecutorial discovery
would constitute a violation
79
of the California Constitution. 1
In Reynolds v. Superior Court,80 the California Supreme
Court indicated that discovery which was broader than that

rejected. Rodriguez 9 Cal. App. 3d at 497, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 156. Until 1981, the California Supreme
Court held the position that prosecutorial discovery would not be permitted in the absence of
statutory law. People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43,48,634 P.2d 534,536, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458,460 (1981).
175. Senator Deulanejian introduced a bill which proposed the addition of a notice-of-alibi rule
to the Penal Code. S. B. 87, Reg. Sess. (1972). Assemblyman Murphy introduced a similar bill with
the stated purpose of promoting the expeditious and fair determination of criminal cases. A. B. 2128,
§ 1, Reg. Sess. (1972). Compare Kane, supra note 27, at 210-15 (claiming that there was no need
for legislation because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams sufficiently guided
courts as to the scope of permissible discovery) with Lapides, supra note 27, at 210-11 (claiming that
there was no need for legislation because the California Supreme Court's decision in Prudhomme
sufficiently guided the courts as to allowable discovery).
176. See S. B. 87, § 1, Reg. Sess. (1972); A. B. 2128, § 1, Reg. Sess. (1972) (requiring a
defendant, upon request, to disclose any alibi defenses, witnesses, or evidence which the defendant
intended to introduce at trial).
177. See Lapides, supra note 27, at 230 n.63 (stating that AB 2128 and SB 87 were opposed
by the California Public Defenders' Association and the Northern California American Civil Liberties
Union on constitutional grounds).
178. See In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543,558,698 P.2d 637,647-48,213 Cal. Rptr. 569,579-80
(1985); Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 527, 557 P.2d 65, 68, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 777
(1976); Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 850, 528 P.2d 45,55, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 447
(1974) (striking down various prosecutorial discovery orders).
179. See, e.g., Reynolds, 12 Cal. 3d at 84243, 528 P.2d at 50, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
180. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
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permitted in Prudhomme might violate the California
Constitution.181 The Reynolds court, faced with a challenge to a
pretrial discovery order fashioned on the requirements laid down
in Williams, stated that Prudhomme had put California on record
as being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against selfincrimination than was required by federal law. 182 The theory that
Prudhomme defined the state constitutional standards for
prosecutorial discovery was confirmed in Allen v. Superior
18 3
Court.
In Allen, the California Supreme Court was asked to prohibit
enforcement of an order which required the defendant to disclose
the names of intended witnesses for the sole purpose of
determining if any of the prospective jurors knew the
witnesses. 84 The Allen court held that the strict standards set out
in Prudhomme defined the parameters of permissible prosecutorial
discovery under the California Constitution, and issued the writ of
prohibition requested by the defendant.18
If any question remained as to the potential validity of an order
compelling the discovery of defense information other than purely
nontestimonial evidence such as fingerprints and blood
samples,"8 6 the California Supreme Court clearly answered in the
negative in In re Misener.'87 In that case, the court struck down
the Legislature's attempt to fashion a reciprocal discovery rule,'88

181. Id. at 842-43, 528 P.2d at 50, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
182. I&
183. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976).
184. IM at 523, 557 P.2d at 66, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 775. The order contained the restriction that
the prosecution could not contact any of the defenses witnesses until the witness's name was

otherwise disclosed at trial. Id
185. Id at 526-27, 557 P.2d at 67-68, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776-77.
186. The California Supreme Court in People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43,634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 458 (1981), continued to follow the decisions in the Prudhomme line of cases, but noted that
the prosecution was permitted to discover non-testimonial evidence such as fingerprints, blood and
breath samples, appearances in lineups, and handwriting and voice exemplars. Id at 56 n.7, 634 P.2d
at 541 n.7, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 465 n.7.
187. 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
188. Id at 545, 698 P.2d at 638, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 570. The rule, Penal Code section 1102.5

(repealed by Proposition 115, June 5, 1990), permitted the prosecution to discover from the defendant
or defense counsel the statements of defense witnesses, other than the defendant, following the direct
examination of those witnesses. Id
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holding that to the extent a compelled disclosure is in any way
useful to the prosecution's case, it violates the defendant's
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." 9
D. ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposition 115
Faced with a state 'upreme court unwilling to expand
prosecutorial discovery through judicial decision, l 9° and also
unwilling to validate specific legislative attempts to bring about
such an expansion,"" California voters, in June of 1990, adopted
by initiative the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act." The Act
had the stated purpose of reforming California criminal procedure
law. 9 3 As part of this comprehensive reform, the Act amended
the state constitution 94 and enacted a statutory reciprocal
discovery scheme."19 Article I, section 24 of the California
Constitution was amended to state that certain rights of a criminal
defendant under the state constitution, including the rights of due

189. Id at 555, 698 P.2d at 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 580. The court stated that a defendant has
absolute right to force the prosecution to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its
own facts, and convince the jury through its own resources. Id. at 558, 698 P.2d at 646, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 578. To the extent that the prosecution gains information through a discovery rule that tends
to negate a defense, it is not investigating its own case, proving its own facts, or convincing the jury
through its own resources. Id
190. See supra notes 132-189 and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme
Court's rulings on the permissible scope of prosecutorial discovery).
191. See In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543,698 P.2d 637,213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985) (invalidating
discovery provisions enacted by the legislature).
192. The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act of 1990, Prop. 115, §§ 1-30, 1990 Cal. Legis.
Serv. A22-31 (West) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 14.1,24,29,30; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§
223, 223.5 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. EvuD. CoDE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 189, 190.2, 190.41,190.5,206,206.1,859,866, 871.6,872,954.1,987.05, 1049.5, 1050.1, 1054,
1054.1, 1054.2, 1054.3, 1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7, 1102.5, 1102.7, 1385.1, 1430, 1511 (West
Supp. 1992)).
193. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (identifying the purpose of Proposition 115).
194. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (amended by Proposition 115); CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 29,
30(a)-(c) (enacted by Proposition 115). The Proposition also made other additions to the California
Constitution, which are beyond the scope of this Note. For an examination of some of the issues
related to Proposition 115 see generally Victims' Rights Symposium, 23 PAC. W. 815 (1992).
195. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1992) (enacted by Proposition 115).
Proposition 115 also made other additions and amendments to the Civil Procedure, Evidence, and
Penal Codes, which are beyond the scope of this Note. For an examination of some of the issues
related to Proposition 115 see generally Victims' Rights Symposium, 23 PAC. L. 815 (1992).
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process of law, equal protection of the law, assistance of counsel,
and the privilege against self-incrimination, should not be construed
to afford greater protections than those afforded by the Constitution
of the United States. 196 Article I, section 30(c) was added to the
California Constitution specifically stating that in order to promote
speedy and fair trials, discovery in criminal cases must be
reciprocal in nature.197 Finally, Chapter 10 was added to the
Penal Code, setting out the specific provisions under which
discovery is to take place in criminal proceedings. 98
These provisions specifically vest the prosecution with a right
to discovery of witnesses, statements, and reports the defense
intends to introduce at trial, as well as the sanction of excluding
these witnesses and evidence in the event the defense refuses to
disclose the information. 199 Such pretrial access to the defense's
information is in direct conflict with the Misener rule that any

196. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. Section 24 was originally added to the constitution in 1974, and
provided only that the rights guaranteed by the California Constitution were not dependant on those

guaranteed by the United States Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (1974, amended 1990). Section
24, as amended by Proposition 115, was held unconstitutional. Raven v. Deuakmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336,
355, 801 P.2d 1077,1089,276 Cal. Rptr. 326,338 (1990), reh 'g denied, 1991 Cal. Lexis 663 (1991).
See infra notes 205-211 and accompanying text (discussing the Raven case).
197. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24(c).
198. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1992). The stated purposes of Chapter
10 are the ascertainment of truth, the saving of court time, and the protection of victims. Id. §
1054(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1992). Chapter 10 requires the prosecution to disclose the names and
addresses of witnesses intended to be called at trial, statements of all defendants, all relevant real
evidence, the felony record of any material witness, any exculpatory evidence, and relevant
statements or reports which are intended to be offered at trial. IL § 1054.1(a)-(t) (West Supp. 1992).
Chapter 10 prohibits disclosure of the address and phone number of a victim to the defendant, absent
court order. Id § 1054.2 (West Supp. 1992). Chapter 10 requires the defendant and defense counsel
to disclose the names and addresses of witnesses intended to be called at trial, as well as any
statements, reports, or real evidence which the defense intends to offer at trial. Id § 1054.3(a)-(b)
(West Supp. 1992). Chapter 10 states that nothing in the Chapter shall be construed as limiting the
prosecution from obtaining nontestimonial evidence as allowed by law. IL § 1054.4 (West Supp.
1992). Chapter 10 provides that allowable discovery shall be made pursuant to an informal request
by the opposing party, and that if such request is not complied with, the court may order discovery.
rd § 1054.5(b) (West Supp. 1992). In the event a party refuses to disclose discoverable information,
the court may impose sanctions, including the exclusion of testimony if all other sanctions have been
exhausted. IL § 1054.5(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1992). Chapter 10 excludes from discovery materials or
information that are privileged or protected as work product. IL § 1054.6 (West Supp. 1992). Finally,
Chapter 10 allows the court to grant a party an in camera review for the purpose of making a
showing of good cause for the denial of disclosure. IL § 1054.7 (West Supp. 1992).
199. Id §§ 1054.3(a)-(b), 1054.5(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1992).
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compelled disclosure useful in proving the prosecution's case is a
violation of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.2 ®
As evidenced by the preamble of Proposition 115, however, the
drafters of Chapter 10 were well aware of the fact that the
proposed discovery provisions were in direct contrast to the thencurrent law in California. 201 The preamble specifically stated that
in order to accomplish the goals of the Proposition, it was
necessary to reform the law as previously developed by California
Supreme Court decisions. 2 It was clear that the drafters were
referring3 to the law developed in the Prudhomme/Misener line of
cases.

20

As might be expected, such a dramatic reversal of the law
quickly sparked a challenge to Proposition 115 by opponents of
reciprocal discovery. 24 The challenge was launched in Raven v.
Deukmejian,2°1 where the Proposition was attacked on its face as
improperly presented to the voters. 2 6 The Proposition was also
attacked as enacting amendments which could not be validly
27
adopted through the initiative process. 0
The California Supreme Court answered the challenge by
striking down section 3 of the Proposition, which would have
amended section 24 of Article I of the Constitution. 2 1 This
amendment would have prohibited California courts from

200. See Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 371, 815 P.2d 304, 313, 285 Cal. Rptr.
231, 241 (1991) (stating that the concept of reciprocal discovery embodied in Proposition 115 is
inherently inconsistent with the Prudhomme/Mifsener line of cases), modifled, rehg denleat 54 Cal.
3d 611a (1991).
201. See Preamble of ProposedLaw, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLeT 33 (June 5, 1990),
reprinted in CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14.1, note (Deerings Supp. 1992) (reprinting section 1(b) of the
preamble of Proposition 115) (stating an intention to overturn past California Supreme Court
decisions).
202. Id.
203. See Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 398, 815 P.2d at 332, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the drafters of Proposition 115 intended to remove the roadblock preventing
prosecutorial discovery which had been established by the Prudhomme/Misenerline of cases).
204. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990)
(challenging the enactment of Proposition 115 as invalid), reh'g denied, 1991 Cal. Lexis 663 (1991).
205. 52 Cal. 3d 336,801 P.2d 1077,276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990), reh'g deniea. 1991 Cal. Lexis
663 (1991).
206. Id. at 340, 801 P.2d at 1079, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
207. Id.
208. Id at 341, 801 P.2d at 1080, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 329.

1750

1992 / Izazaga v. Superior Court
construing the state constitution as providing criminal defendants
with greater rights than those afforded by the United States
The court in Raven held section 3 to be a
Constitution.'
qualitative constitutional revision which was beyond the reach of
the initiative process.21° The court stated, however, that the
remaining sections of Proposition 115, including the amendment to
section 30 of the state constitution and the Chapter 10 discovery
211
provisions, were severable, and could properly be given effect.
Despite the fact that the new reciprocal discovery provisions were
held to be validly enacted, the question remained whether the
mandated discovery was substantively constitutional. This question
was answered in Izazaga v. Superior Court.1 2

I1. THE CASE
A. The Facts
On June 18, 1990, Javier Valle Izazaga and a codefendant were
charged with two counts of forcible rape and one count of
kidnapping. 213 The People, under newly adopted Penal Code

209. See CAL. CONST. art I, § 24 (held to be unconstitutional in the Raven case).
210. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 341, 801 P.2d at 1080, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Amendments to the
state constitution may be accomplished through the initiative process. CAL. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3.
Constitutional revisions on the other hand, may only be accomplished by convening a constitutional
convention and obtaining popular ratification, or by legislative submission of the revision to the
voters. Id §§ 1, 2. The state constitution does not define the terms "amendment" or "revision," but
court decisions have set forth an analysis for determining whether a specific change is an amendment
or a revision. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,260, 651 P.2d 274,288, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,
44 (1982); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
223, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (1978). Under the judicial analysis, both the
quantitative and qualitative effects of a measure are examined, and if either effect is substantial, the
measure is likely to be deemed a revision. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 350, 801 P.2d at 1085,276 Cal. Rptr.
at 334. Such was the case with the amendment to Article 1, section 24 of the California Constitution
adopted under section 3 of Proposition 115. Id at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
211. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr, at 332.
212. 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304,285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991), modiied reh'g denied, 54 Cal.
3d 611a (1991).
213. Id at 363, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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section 1054.5(b), 2 14 served Izazaga with an informal discovery
request seeking the names, addresses, and statements of the
witnesses whom Izazaga intended to call at trial.215 Izazaga
refused to disclose this information. 216 In response, the
prosecution filed a217motion to compel discovery under Penal Code
section 1054.5(b).
Izazaga opposed the prosecution's motion, claiming that the
requested discovery violated his protections under the United States
Constitution.1 Specifically, Izazaga claimed that the state's
motion violated the privilege against self-incrimination under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments,2 19 the right to effective
assistance of counsel under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments," ° and the right to due process of the law under the
fourteenth amendment.Y

214. Section 1054.5(b) was adopted as part of Chapter 10 of the California Penal Code under
section 23 of Proposition 115, and provides the following:
Before a party may seek court enforcement of any of the disclosures required by this
chapter, the party shall make an informal request of opposing counsel for the desired
materials and information. If within 15 days the opposing counsel fails to provide the
materials and information requested, the party may seek a court order. Upon a showing
that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or 1054.3 and upon a showing that the
moving party complied with the informal discovery procedure provided in this
subdivision, a court may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this
chapter, including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings,
delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence,
continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. Further, the court may advise the
jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any untimely disclosure.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(b) (West Supp. 1992).
215. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 363, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
216. Id at 364, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
217. Id.
218. Id
219. Id at 365, 815 P.2d at 309, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 236. Under the fifth amendment Izazaga
argued that the forced disclosure of the names and addresses of al the witnesses the defense intends
to call at trial effectively forced a defendant to become a witness against himself. Id at 366,815 P.2d
at 310,285 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
220. Id at 379, 815 P.2d at 319, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246. Under the sixth amendment Izazaga
argued that forcing the defense to disclose statements of its witnesses would have the effect of
chilling the defense counsel's motivation for making a thorough investigation into possible witnesses.
I,4
221. Id at 372-77, 815 P.2d at 314-18, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242-46. Izazaga argued that the
discovery rules violated his due process rights because various procedures lacked the necessary
reciprocity, and because the prosecution was not sufficiently required by the rules to disclose
exculpatory evidence. Id
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Following a hearing, the superior court granted the People's
motion and issued an order allowing discovery. m The California
Supreme Court, in response to a petition by Izazaga, stayed the
enforcement of the discovery order and granted review.' 2 The
People then moved the court to decide the additional question of
whether the new discovery provisions violated a criminal
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the California
Constitution. 224 Izazaga joined this motion and the California
Supreme Court granted review of this additional question.'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Lucas, joined by Justices
Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter, held that the new discovery rules did
not violate either the federal or the state constitutions.226 Justice
Kennard concurred in the opinion.227 Justices Mosk and
Broussard each wrote a dissenting opinion."
B. The Majority Opinion
1. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination Under the United
States Constitution
The majority's opinion initially addressed Izazaga's contention
that the trial court's discovery order, which required the disclosure
of the names, addresses, and statements of witnesses the defendant

222. 1,d at 364, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
223. I,4 at 364, 815 P.2d at 309,285 Cal. Rptr. at 236. The petition to the supreme court came
after Izazaga sought a writ of prohibition or mandate from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Appellate DistricL .,RThe appellate court declined to hear the case on the procedural ground that the
California Supreme Court was the appropriate forum. Xd. at 389, 815 P.2d at 326, 285 Cal. Rptr. at
253 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
224. Id at 389, 815 P.2d at 327, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 254 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 390, 815 P.2d at 327, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 254 (Mask, J., dissenting).
226. See infra notes 229-352 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion).
227. See infra notes 353-365 and accompanying text (discussing the concurrence of Justice
Kennard).
228. See infra notes 366-413 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinions of
Justices Mask and Broussard).
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intended to introduce at trial,229 violated the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination." The majority rejected the
claim that requiring pretrial disclosure of such information
effectively forced the defendant to become a witness against
himself.23 Citing United States Supreme Court precedent that
defined the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
majority noted that the privilege was only triggered if four
requirements were met.232 First, the information must be obtained
by compulsion. 3 Second, it must be incriminating.234 Third, it
must be testimonial or communicative
in nature.235 Finally, it
236
must be personal to the defendant.
After establishing these requirements, the Izazaga majority
evaluated whether the disclosures mandated by the trial court were
valid under the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution.237 The case of Williams v. Florida238 was cited to
show that a pretrial discovery order does not necessarily meet the
compulsion requirement. 9 In Williams, the United States
Supreme Court held that a discovery order which called for the
pretrial disclosure of the names and addresses of alibi witnesses
intended to be called at trial did not violate the fifth amendment

229. The order also required the disclosure of any reports or statements of experts intended to
be introduced at trial, as well as any tangible or physical evidence the defendant intended to
introduce. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 364 n.1, 815 P.2d at 309 n.1, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.1. The order,
made pursuant to Chapter 10 of the Penal Code, specifically excluded the disclosure of the
defendant's statements or his intention to testify at trial. Id.
230. M at 365, 815 P.2d at 309, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
231. Id
232. Id at 366, 815 P.2d at 310,285 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988)). The majority also stated that the four
requirements emanate directly from the wording of the self-incrimination clause. Ma at n.4.
233. Id at 366, 815 P.2d at 310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
234. d
235. Id
236. Id
237. Id
238. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See supranote 70-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Williams
opinion).
239. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 366, 815 P.2d at 310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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privilege against self-incrimination.24 The Izazaga majority
stated that the self-incrimination holding in Williams was based on
the fact that the disclosure did not satisfy the requirement of
compulsion.241 Rather, the disclosure in Williams was merely
accelerated from the time of trial to the pretrial stage.242 It was
immaterial to the majority that the Williams case involved the
disclosure of alibi witnesses, as opposed to any and all witnesses
as in Izazaga's case.243 The pretrial discovery of the names and
addresses of witnesses the defense intends to call, whether
supporting an alibi or not, merely forced the defendant to divulge
earlier that which the defendant already intended to divulge at
trial. 2 " Therefore, no fifth amendment privilege was triggered by
the pretrial discovery of the names and addresses of intended
witnesses.2 4

With respect to the pretrial discovery of witness statements, the
majority acknowledged Izazaga's argument that such disclosure
might have the effect of compelling information from the
defendant. 246 The majority also acknowledged the possibility that
some of the disclosed statements would not actually be presented
at trial, and therefore the disclosure of information would not be
merely accelerated.247 Moreover, some of the information in the
witnesses' statements could possibly be incriminating, resulting in
the compulsion of incriminating information. 248 Finally, the

240. Id Responding to Izazaga's argument that the United States Supreme Court decision in
Williams should be distinguished from his case, the majority rejected the idea that the selfincrimination issue in Wiliams was based on the state's special interest in preventing the fabrication
of eleventh-hour alibis. Il The majority pointed out the issue of a special state interest related to the
due process and fair trial issues in Wlliams, not the issue of self-incrimination. L The privilege was

not triggered solely because a special state interest was absent-the interests of a state had no effect
on the four elements required to trigger the privilege against self-incrimination. IL
241. L
242. Ad at 367, 815 P.2d at 310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237.

243. Id
244. I
245. l In a footnote the majority rejected a claim by Justice Broussard that the majority's
analysis was flawed, and that the Brooks case, not Willams, was the controlling precedent on the

self-incrimination issue. l n.5.
246.

L at 367, 815 P.2d at 311, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 238.

247.

L

248.

Id
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majority acknowledged that the witness's statements would clearly
be testimonial or communicative in nature as required by
Schmerber in order to trigger the self-incrimination privilege.249
The majority in Izazaga noted, however, that the compulsion of
incriminating, testimonial information was, by itself, not enough to
trigger the privilege against self-incrimination;'o the information
must also be personal to the defendant.21 Citing United States v.
Nobles, 2 the majority stated that the testimony or statements of
witnesses was not information personal to the defendant." The
majority noted that in Nobles, the United States Supreme Court
held that the self-incrimination privilege applied only to
information obtained from the defendant, not information obtained
from other sources that may incriminate the defendant, even if the
statements were obtained on behalf of the defendant. 254 In
addition, the physical act of handing over the statements by the
defendant does not make the disclosure personal to the defendant,
thereby triggering the privilege against self-incrimination. 5
According to Nobles, the production of third parties' statements
by the defendant does not trigger the privilege, because such
production does not reveal the defendant's knowledge of facts
relating him to the offense, nor does it require him to share his
thoughts or beliefs with the prosecution. 6 Since the discovery
order applied only to the statements of third parties, and not
Izazaga's own statements, the majority concluded that Nobles was
the applicable controlling precedent. 2 7 For these reasons, the
majority held that discovery by the prosecution under Penal Code

249.
250.
necessary
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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Id See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing the four requirements
to trigger the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 368, 815 P.2d at 311, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
422 U.S. 225 (1975).
Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 368, 815 P.2d at 311, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
M
Id at 369 n.8, 815 P.2d at 312 n.8, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.8.
Id
Id at 368, 815 P.2d at 311-12, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.

1992 / Izazaga v. Superior Court
against selfsection 1054.3 was not violative of Izazaga's privilege
58
incrimination under the United States Constitution.
2. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under The State
Constitution
After finding that the discovery provisions under Chapter 10 of
the California Penal Code did not violate Izazaga's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the majority
addressed the issue of a potential violation of the privilege under
the California Constitution." The majority began this portion of
its opinion by observing that a criminal defendant is guaranteed
certain procedural rights under Article I, section 15 of the
California Constitution, including the privilege against selfincrimination.2" Further, prior to the passage of Proposition 115,
a long line of cases interpreting the right against self-incrimination
had concluded that nearly any form of prosecutorial discovery
would be a violation of the state constitution.261
The majority noted, however, that Proposition 115 not only
added a reciprocal discovery scheme to the Penal Code, but also
validly amended the state constitution to mandate reciprocal
discovery in criminal cases. 262 The majority noted that
fundamental principles of constitutional construction mandate that
when a recently adopted provision can be reasonably construed to
avoid conflict with existing law, such an interpretation should be
adopted. 263 However, where a recent, specific provision creates
a direct conflict with more general existing provisions, the old

258. Id at 369, 815 P.2d at 312, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
259. Id
260. Id See supra notes 132-189 and accompanying text (discussing California cases
interpreting the scope of the privilege under the state constitution).
261. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 369, 815 P.2d at 312, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 239. See supra notes 132189 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of permissible prosecutorial discovery as interpreted
by the California courts).
262. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 371, 815 P.2d at 313, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
263. Id at 371, 815 P.2d at 314,285 Cal. Rptr. at 241 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
596, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rplr. 601, 609 (1971)).
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provisions must be viewed as limited.2' Applying these rules of
construction, the majority stated that the adoption of section 30 to
Article I of the state constitution, which specifically mandated
reciprocal discovery, could not coexist with the narrow
Prudhomme/Misener interpretation of permissible prosecutorial
discovery under the general privilege against self-incrimination
included in Article I, section 15 of the state constitution. 265 Thus,
the majority concluded that the adoption of section 30 should be
interpreted as abrogating the narrow interpretation of permissible
prosecutorial discovery announced in the Prudhomme/Misenerline
of cases. 2' The majority held that the general self-incrimination
privilege under section 15 was limited by section 30, to the extent
that the reciprocal discovery provisions of Chapter 10 did not
conflict with a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
under the state constitution.2 67 Therefore, the discovery ordered
against Izazaga by the trial court pursuant to Chapter 10 was not
contrary to the state privilege against self-incrimination.268 The
majority also indicated that such a finding was consistent with the
intent of the voters in passing Proposition 115.269 As a result, the
majority declined to accept Izazaga's contention that compelled
reciprocal discovery under Chapter 10 was a violation of his state
privilege against self-incrimination.Y
3. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel
a. Trial Preparationby Defense Counsel
The majority began its examination of possible sixth
amendment violations by responding to Izazaga's claim that the
264. Id.
265.
cases).

Id See supra notes 147-189 and accompanying text (discussing the Prudhomme line of

266.
267.

Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 371, 815 P.2d at 314, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
Id

268.

Id

269.

id

270. Id
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liberal discovery of witnesses and their statements under Penal
Code section 1054.3 chills defense counsel from conducting
thorough pretrial investigations.271 This chilling effect, according
to Izazaga, resulted in a violation of his right to effective assistance
of counsel under the sixth amendment.272
The majority initially noted that the United States Supreme
Court had never struck down a discovery scheme on the basis of
a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.273 Next,
the majority explained that the new California discovery provisions
would not have the practical effect of chilling an exhaustive pretrial
investigation by the defendant's counsel.274 This was because the
defense could prevent the prosecution from gaining access to
witnesses and statements uncovered by the defense that would aid
the prosecution.275 The majority reiterated that the required
disclosure under section 1054.3 applies only to those witnesses who
the defense intends to call at trial276 The majority found it
logical to assume that the defense will call only witnesses who are
helpful to the defendant's case.27 The defense need not disclose
the names or statements of any witnesses that would aid the
prosecution, so long as these witnesses were not to be called at
trial. 278 In light of this protection, the majority saw no possibility

271. Id. at 379, 815 P.2d at 319, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
272. Id.
273. Id at 379, 815 P.2d at 319, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246. In his dissent, Justice Broussard
attacked the majority's statement, by pointing out that even if true, it did not necessarily establish
that discovery under Chapter 10 was constitutional. Il at 407,815 P.2d at 338,285 Cal. Rptr. at 265
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
274. Id at 379-80, 815 P.2d at 319-20, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47.

275.

Id

276. Id Section 1054.3 sets out the following requirements:
The defendant and his or her attorney shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney:

(a) The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he or she intends to call
as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or recorded statements of those
persons, or reports of the statements of those persons, including any reports or statements
of experts made in connection with the case, and including the results of physical or
mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the defendant
intends to offer in evidence at the trial.
(b) Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial.
CAL PENAL CODE § 1054.3 (West Supp. 1992).
277. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 379, 815 P.2d at 319, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
278. Id.
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of chilling an exhaustive investigation by the defense counsel
which would impede a defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel.279
The majority noted that its reasoning was in line with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Nobles,'8 where the Supreme Court stated that the sixth
amendment does not give a defendant the right to present evidence
free from the legitimate demands of the criminal justice
system."' In Nobles, the trial court ordered the defense, once it
called its investigator as a trial witness, to disclose the
investigator's report of statements made by the prosecution's
witnesses. 2 " The Nobles Court rejected the notion that requiring
a defendant to disclose a report prepared by a defense investigator
283
violated a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
Izazaga argued that Nobles was distinguishable from his case
because the defendant in Nobles had waived his sixth amendment
rights by putting the investigator on the stand. 284 In Izazaga's
case there could be no similar waiver since the trial court had
ordered pretrial disclosure. 85
The Izazaga majority acknowledged that in Nobles the
defendant had waived his sixth amendment right by voluntarily
making use of the investigator's report at trial, but pointed out that
the United States Supreme Court had stated that even in the
28 6
absence of a waiver, the sixth amendment was not violated.

279. IM
280. 422 U.S. 225 (1975). See supra notes 120-131 and accompanying text (discussing the
Nobles decision).
281. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 379, 815 P.2d at 319-20, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27 (citing Nobles,
422 U.S. at 241).

282.

Id (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 240 n.15).

283. Id (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 240 n.15).
284. Id at 379-80, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
285. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring that disclosures be made
at least 30 days prior to trial).
286. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d. at 380, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (citing Nobles, 422

U.S. at 240 n.15). In a footnote, the majority rejected Izazaga's reliance on the case of People v.
Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981), to reach a contrary conclusion. Id
n.16. In Cof/We, the court stated that if discovery of a defense investigator's report is allowed, the
defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel is potentially threatened. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d
at 55-56, 634 P.2d at 540, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 464. The majority stated that this language was merely
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According to the Nobles Court, the state has a legitimate interest
in preventing testimonial half-truths. 7 Moreover, the Court's
order in that case was limited to relevant portions of the
investigator's report, and conditioned upon the investigator's
testimony.288 The majority in Izazaga stated that the discovery
mandated under Chapter 10 was similarly designed to prevent the
Further,
presentation of false or misleading testimony."
discovery under the Chapter 10 provisions was limited to relevant
statements and reports, and conditioned upon the defense's intent
to introduce the witnesses or information at trial.2" The majority
also refused to distinguish Nobles in that, in Nobles, the disclosure
took place during the trial, as opposed to the pretrial stage as was
the case with the discovery order applied to Izazaga. 291 The
majority could find no credible argument that the timing of the
required disclosure would implicate any sixth amendment
violation.2" Therefore, the majority held that the pretrial
discovery order granted against Izazaga did not violate his right to
effective assistance of counsel.29 3
b. Work Product Doctrine Protection
After holding that the new discovery provisions did not violate
the sixth amendment by discouraging exhaustive pretrial
investigation, the majority examined Izazaga's facial claim that
because of the work product doctrine, 294 the compulsion of
witness statements gathered by the defense violated the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 25 On this
point, the majority stated that the work product doctrine, as

dictum. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 380 n.16, 815 P.2d at 320 n.16, 285 Cal. Rptr. 247 n.16.
287. lit at 379,815 P.2d at 319-20, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47 (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 241).
288. Md at 380, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
289. id at 379, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
290. Id. at 380, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
291. IX
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 110-131 and accompanying text (discussing the work product doctrine).
295. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 380-81, 815 P.2d at 320-21, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
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developed in Hickman v. Taylor296 and as applied to criminal
trials in Nobles, was not founded upon any sixth amendment
297
right.
In a footnote, the majority addressed Justice Kennard's
assertion that perhaps work product protection was grounded in the
sixth amendment.298 The majority rejected Justice Kennard's
contention that the United States Supreme Court in Nobles had
"hinted"
that work product might be constitutionally
299
protected.
The majority did not find that same "hint" in
Nobles, and found it untenable that a doctrine created by the
Supreme Court in a civil case was actually founded upon the right
to counsel clause applicable only to criminal defendants.3"
Further, in Greyhound Corporation v. Superior Court,30 1 the
California Supreme Court had held that the Hickman doctrine was
a federally created privilege, based on federal policy, and was not
a privilege that existed in California. 3" The privilege did not
exist in California courts because it was founded neither in the
federal nor the state constitutions, and because the privilege had not
been codified in California when the Greyhound case was
decided. 0 3
Although there remains no constitutional work product
protection under either the state or federal constitution, the Izazaga
majority noted that, subsequent to the Greyhound decision,
California had enacted statutory work product protection applicable

296.

329 U.S. 495 (1947).

297.

Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247.

298. Id at 381 n.18, 815 P.2d at 321 n.18, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.18.
299. Id In Nobles the United States Supreme Court stated:
Although the work-product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery in
civil litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system
is even more vital. The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair and
accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards
assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
300. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381 n.18, 815 P.2d at 321 n.18, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.18.
301. 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
302. Izazaga, 54 CaL 3d at 381, 815 P.2d at 321,285 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
303. Id
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in civil trials." Under section 2018 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, work product of an attorney is undiscoverable
except where the court determines that preventing such discovery
would unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery, or would
result in an injustice." 5 In addition, what has been called "core"
work product, that is work product that reflects an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, or opinions, may not be
discovered under any circumstances. 6
The Izazaga majority acknowledged that these civil provisions
had been applied in California criminal cases by judicial
decision. 3" The majority also pointed out that work product was
specifically excluded from discovery under Chapter 10.308
However, Chapter 10 specifically limited the definition of work
product in criminal trials to include only core work product.3°
Despite the narrower definition under the criminal discovery
provisions, the court held that the new discovery rules were not
subject to Izazaga's facial challenge that the provisions violated the
right to effective assistance of counsel.310

304. Id See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2018 (West Supp. 1992) (codifying work product
protection).
305. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247. See CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE § 2018(b) (West Supp. 1992) (providing protection for ordinary work product).
306. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381, 815 P.2d at 321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 2018(c) (West Supp. 1992) (providing protection for core work product).
307. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381, 815 P.2d at 321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248. See People v. Collie,
30 Cal. 3d 43,59,634 P.2d 534,543, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458,467 (1981) (holding that the work product
doctrine applies in criminal cases).
308. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381, 815 P.2d at 321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248. Chapter 10 contains
the following provision relating to work product protection:
Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any materials
or information which are work product as defined in subdivision (c) of section 2018 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, or which are privileged pursuant to an express statutory
provision, or are privileged as provided by the Constitution of the United States.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.6 (West Supp. 1992).
309. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 382 n.19, 815 P.2d at 321 n.19, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.19.
310. l at 381-82, 815 P.2d at 321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
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4. The Right to Due Process of Law Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
In addition to addressing Izazaga's aforementioned fifth and
sixth amendment claims, the majority examined Izazaga's claim
that the discovery provisions within Chapter 10 were facially
repugnant to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.31' Initially, the majority examined the relationship
between discovery in criminal cases and the requirements of due
process." Noting that the prosecution has a duty to disclose any
exculpatory evidence it obtains," 3 the majority in Izazaga stated
that due process does not define the amount of discovery
permissible in criminal trials.3 14 The due process clause, however,
does define the balance of forces between the state and the
accused.3" 5 Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court held
in Wardius v. Oregon,"6 discovery must be reciprocal in order
to meet the requirements of due process.317
According to the Izazaga majority, such mandated reciprocity
was inherent in the new discovery provisions.1 8 First, article I,
section 30(c) of the state constitution, which was enacted
contemporaneously with the Chapter 10 discovery provisions,
requires reciprocal discovery in criminal cases.319 The majority
noted that it would be logical to assume that since Proposition 115
contained both section 30(c) and Chapter 10, the voters intended
discovery under Chapter 10 to be reciprocal.32 Second, the
discovery provisions themselves provide for reciprocal
discovery.321 In order to illustrate this reciprocity, the majority

311.
312.
313.

Id at 372, 815 P.2d at 314-15, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42.
Id
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the defendant has a

constitutional right to discover any exculpatory evidence obtained or known by the prosecution).
314. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 372, 815 P.2d at 315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
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Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 373, 815 P.2d at 315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
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Id
Id
Id at 374, 815 P.2d at 316, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
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compared discovery by the prosecution under Penal Code section
1054.3 with discovery by the defense under section 1054.1.322
The majority concluded that if any imbalance exists, it favors the
defendant as required by the Wardius holding.323 Therefore,
Izazaga's facial due process challenge was rejected.324
The majority also rejected Izazaga's argument that the new
discovery provisions violated his due process rights because the
provisions failed to provide for automatic reciprocal discovery.3z
The majority found no merit in the argument that the provisions
provided inadequate protection because a defendant could be forced
to disclose information without the prosecution automatically
reciprocating. 326 In Wardius, the United States Supreme Court
held that due process demands that a defendant be given notice of
the opportunity to discover the prosecution's witnesses.327 The
Izazaga majority identified that Penal Code section 1054.5(b)
provides such notice, and further that the procedural requirement
of making a request for discovery was available equally to the
prosecution and the defense.328 Since both the prosecution and
defense were given equal notice and opportunity to compel
discovery, the majority was unable to find any denial of due
process.

329

322. Id The majority noted that both the prosecution and defense were required to disclose the
names of witnesses intended to be called at trial, but the defendant need not disclose whether or not
the defendant intended to testify. Id The majority also noted that while the prosecution must disclose
all relevant real evidence seized or obtained during its investigation, the defendant was required only
to disclose real evidence which the defendant intended to introduce at trial. Id
323. Id
324. Id
325. Id Under Chapter 10, a party may obtain discoverable material by making an informal
request of the opposing counsel for the desired information. CA. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(b) (West
Supp. 1992). If the request is not complied with in 15 days, the party seeking discovery may seek
a court order mandating the discovery. Id A request must be made for any discoverable materials
because the provisions do not provide for automatic reciprocal discovery. Id §§ 1054-1054.7 (West
Supp. 1992).
326. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 374, 815 P.2d at 316, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
327. Id at 374-75, 815 P.2d at 316,285 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470, 479 (1973)).
328. Id
329. I
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The majority likewise rejected Izazaga's claim that under
Chapter 10 the prosecution had no duty to disclose witnesses
intended to rebut disclosed defense witnesses and evidence.33
The majority did not accept Izazaga's theory that since the
prosecution need only disclose those witnesses intended to be
called at trial, the discovery rules did not require the prosecution
to disclose rebuttal witnesses until the prosecution had seen who
the defense actually called at trial.33 The majority acknowledged
that due process requires the defendant be given the opportunity to
discover the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses, but found nothing in
the new discovery provisions which denied the defendant such an
opportunity.332 In fact, the majority determined that the new
provisions included rebuttal witnesses by implication.333 The new
rules require the disclosure of the names and addresses of persons
the prosecution intends to call at trial. 334 The plain language of
"at trial," according to the Izazaga majority, included both the
prosecution's case-in-chief and any rebuttal. 335 Since the
prosecution's discovery was triggered by the witnesses the defense
intended to call, it must necessarily be assumed that the prosecution
would intend to call any of its witnesses who could be used to
refute any defense witness that might be called.336 Since both the
prosecution and defense were bound by the same definition of
"intends to call," the majority found the new provisions provided
sufficient reciprocity to satisfy due process requirements. 7
The majority next rejected Izazaga's alternative argument that
discovery under Chapter 10 violated due process in that, after the
disclosure of defense witnesses, the prosecution was only required

330. Id. at 375, 815 P.2d at 316-17, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.

333.

Id.

334.

Id

335.

Id

336.

Id. The majority went on in a footnote to adopt a definition for "intends to call" which

the Ohio Supreme Court had established in State v. Howard,56 Ohio St. 2d 328, 331, 383 N.E_2d
912,915 (1978). Id. at 376 n.11, 815 P.2d at 316 n.1 1, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 244 n.1 1. According to the
Ohio Supreme Court, "intends to call" includes all witnesses the prosecution reasonably anticipates

it is likely to call at triaL Id.
337.
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to disclose a list of rebuttal witnesses and their recorded
statements.33 Izazaga claimed that due process required the
disclosure of all the information gathered by the prosecution which
could be used to refute the disclosed defense witnesses, whether or
not it was intended to be introduced at trial.3 9 The majority cited
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams to show
that such disclosure by the prosecution was not required to satisfy
due process. 34
The discovery statute challenged in Williams did not require the
prosecution to disclose all its rebuttal evidence." It required
only the disclosure of rebuttal witnesses and their statements which
were intended to be introduced, and was found to adequately
satisfy the requirements of due process. 42 The majority in
Izazaga stated that the due process requirement of reciprocity
called for a fair trade of information and nothing more. 3 Since
the defendant was not compelled by the new discovery provisions
to reveal any rebuttal evidence other than the witnesses' names,
addresses, and statements, there was no requirement that the
prosecution disclose more than the same.' Since the disclosure
requirements under Chapter 10 were nearly symmetrical, with any
imbalance of advantage favoring the defendant, the majority held
that discovery under Chapter 10 did not violate a defendant's due
process rights. 45

338.
339.

Id at 376, 815 P.2d at 317, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
Id

340. Id.
341. Id (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970)).
342. Id (citing Wil/iams, 399 U.S. at 81-82).
343. Id at 377, 815 P.2d at 317, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 245. The majority acknowledged that
language in the Wardius opinion indicating that "it is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant
to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to a hazard of surprise
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State," could be
interpreted as supporting Izazaga's claim. Id The majority stated that although this language could
be interpreted as requiring the disclosure of all the prosecutor's rebuttal evidence, it was not a correct

interpretation of the Wardius opinion and the due process clause. Id All that was required by the due
process clause was a fair trade of information. Id

344.

Id

345. Id See supra notes 244-258 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis
of how a defendant retains the advantage where the discovery provisions do not call for strict
reciprocity).
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Finally, the majority addressed Izazaga's claim that the new
discovery provisions failed to require the disclosure of all
exculpatory evidence as mandated by the United States Supreme
Court's rulings in Brady v. Maryland 46 and its progeny. 47 The
Brady line of cases established that in order for a defendant to
receive a fair trial as required by the due process clause, the
prosecution has an affirmative duty to disclose any substantial and
material evidence which is favorable to the accused, whether or not
such disclosure is requested.3 48 The majority in Izazaga found it
unnecessary to discuss the scope of Penal Code section 1054. 1(e),
which Izazaga argued defined the prosecutor's duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence more narrowly than the duty had been defined
by the Brady line of cases.3 49 The majority pointed out that
regardless of how the duty was defined in Chapter 10, the
350
prosecutor was obligated to satisfy the requirements of Brady.
The prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady
operates independently of any state statutory scheme.
The
majority in Izazaga held therefore, that even if the state provision
could be more narrowly interpreted, it did not limit a defendant's
due process rights to such evidence, because the United State
Supreme Court's ruling in Brady would control the prosecutor's
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.352

346. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
347. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 377, 815 P.2d at 318, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 245. See United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-83 (1985); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485-91 (1984); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-14 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1972)
(defining the constitutional requirements for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence).
348. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 378, 815 P.2d at 318, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
349. I4 at 378, 815 P.2d at 318-19, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
350. IM
351. Id
352. Id The majority also addressed several other challenges Izazaga had leveled at the Chapter
10 discovery provisions. Id at 382-83, 815 P.2d at 322-23, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50. First, lzazaga
argued that beyond the facial validity of Chapter 10, there could be instances where the discovery
provisions as applied would violate the United States Constitution. Id at 382, 815 P.2d at 322, 285
Cal. Rptr. at 249. The majority pointed out that Penal Code section 1054.6 prohibits the forced
disclosure of any materials or information which are privileged under the United States Constitution,
and therefore, a defendant retained adequate protection under the Constitution. Id Next, Izazaga
argued that the discovery provisions failed to provide any procedural means for raising constitutional
issues which might arise out of the required discovery. Id The majority rejected this argument, and
stated that the constitutional rights of a defendant are self-executing and need no statutory
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C. The Concurring Opinion of Justice Kennard
Justice Kennard began her concurrence by stating that she
agreed with the greater part of the majority's opinion, but disagreed
with the majority's analysis of Izazaga's claim that the new
discovery scheme infringed upon his sixth amendment rights by
violating the work product doctrine.353 According to Justice
Kennard, the majority, in reviewing the Hicknan case and its
progeny, leaped to the conclusion that there was no constitutional
foundation for the work product doctrine.354
Justice Kennard stated that the United States Supreme Court in
Hickman did not reach the question of whether there was a
constitutional basis for the work product doctrine because the Court
disposed of the Hiclanan case on statutory grounds. 55 Contrary
to the majority's position, Justice Kennard contended that the
Supreme Court's decision in Nobles could be viewed as implying
that the work product privilege was an integral part of the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.356 To support
this implication, Justice Kennard noted that the Supreme Court in

enforcement mechanism. Id Furthermore, nothing in the new provisions prevented a defendant, as
Izazaga did in his case, from utilizing existing avenues for challenging orders of a trial court. Id
Finally, Izazaga argued that section 3 of Proposition 115, which purports to require the interpretation
of certain state constitutional rights be consistent with analogous rights in the United States
Constitution, denied him equal protection of the law. Id at 383, 815 P.2d at 323, 285 Cal. Rptr. at
250. The majority noted that its decision in Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077,
276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990), striking and severing section 3 from Proposition 115, rendered Izazaga's
argument moot. Id
353. Id at 383-84, 815 P.2d at 322-23, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50. (Kennard, J., concurring).
354. Id. at 384, 815 P.2d at 323, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250. (Kennard, ., concurring). In a footnote,
Justice Kennard stated that the majority's reliance on Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Cour4 56 Cal.
2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961), case for the proposition that the work product
doctrine was not rooted in the United States Constitution was in error. Id n.1 (Kennard, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennard could find no discussion of the federal Constitution in the Greyhound
opinion. Id (Kennard, J., concurring). Further, since Greyhound involved a civil action, and sixth
amendment rights applied only in criminal trials, any discussion of the relationship between the right
to counsel and the work product doctrine would have been irrelevant to the case. Id (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
355. Id at 384, 815 P.2d at 323,285 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Kennard, J., concurring). See Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947) (deciding the case on statutory grounds).
356. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 384-85, 815 P.2d at 323, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
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Nobles cited Hickman for the proposition that in order to ensure
protection of a client's interests a lawyer's work must be afforded
a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusions by
opposing counsel.35 7 After noting that Hickman was a civil case,
doctrine
the Nobles Court stated that the role of the work product
358
system.
justice
criminal
was even more vital in the
Justice Kennard went on to note, however, that even if work
product is constitutionally protected by the sixth amendment, there
was no violation in Izazaga's case. 359 This was so because the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Nobles that when a
defendant calls a witness at trial, the privilege is waived.360
Justice Kennard reasoned that under the new discovery provisions
a waiver by the defendant could constitutionally be anticipated
since the discovery was limited to the statements of those witnesses
whom the defense intends to call at trial.361 According to Justice
Kennard, this does not mean that the information discovered before
trial could validly be used by the prosecution if the defense does
not call the witness. 362 In that situation, the prosecution would be
prohibited from utilizing the disclosed information.363 There was,
however, no indication in Izazaga's case that the prosecution would
make an improper use of the discovered statements.3" Therefore,
although Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's analysis of
the work product issue, she agreed that Izazaga's sixth amendment
privilege was not violated.365
D. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Mosk
Justice Mosk prefaced his dissent by stating that the discovery
scheme adopted under Proposition 115 was invalid under the

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
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Id at 385, 815 P.2d at 323-24, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Md(Kennard, J., concurring).
Id at 387, 815 P.2d at 325, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 252. (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id at 386, 815 P.2d at 324, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 251. (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id (Kennard, L, concurring).
Id (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id at 387, 815 P.2d at 325, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (Kennard, J., concurring).
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California Constitution, and therefore the challenged discovery
order was unsupported as a matter of law.3" Justice Mosk
maintained that the reciprocal discovery provisions violated the
privilege against self-incrimination embodied in Article I, section
15 of the state constitution.? 7 Accordingly, Justice Mosk limited
his dissenting opinion to that proposition.3
Justice Mosk first discussed the interplay between compelled
discovery and the privilege against self-incrimination as interpreted
by the California courts.369 Justice Mosk concluded his
chronological review of previous decisions with a reference to the
Misener case in which the California Supreme Court struck down,
as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
California Legislature's attempt to fashion a reciprocal discovery
provision. 370 According to Justice Mosk, Misener established the
rule that discovery is unconstitutional if it has the effect of
assisting the prosecution in carrying the burden of proving the
defendant's guilt.3 71 In light of this precedent, Justice Mosk was
compelled to find the new reciprocal discovery provisions violative
of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, since
their very nature and purpose was to aid the prosecution in
372
obtaining criminal convictions.
Justice Mosk rejected the idea that the enactment of Proposition
115 altered or limited the privilege against self-incrimination
provided in Article I, section 15 and as interpreted by the decisions
in Prudhomme and Misener.373 Justice Mosk contended that the
drafters of Proposition 115 intended to remove the "roadblock" to

366. Id at 387, 815 P.2d at 325, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
367. Id at 390, 815 P.2d at 327, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 254 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
368. Id at 387-402, 815 P.2d at 325-335, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 253-62 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
369. Id at 390-97, 815 P.2d at 327-31, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 254-58 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
370. Id at 396, 815 P.2d at 331, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra notes
187-189 and accompanying text (discussing the Misener decision).
371. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 396, 815 P.2d at 331,285 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
372. Id at 397, 815 P.2d at 332, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
373. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting). Dissenting in the Raven case, Justice Mosk argued that section
30(c) could not be separated from the amendment to section 24 which was invalidated by the court,
and therefore the whole of Proposition 115 was invalid and without effect. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52
Cal. 3d 336, 366, 801 P.2d 1077, 1096-97, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 345-46 (1990) (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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prosecutorial discovery erected by the Prudhomme/Misenerline of
cases.374 According to Justice Mosk, in order to accomplish this,
the drafters utilized a three step approach.375 First, Article I,
section 15 of the state constitution, which contains the state
privilege against self-incrimination was amended. 376 The
amendment provided that the constitution was not to be interpreted
to afford criminal defendants rights greater than those afforded by
the United States Constitution. 377 This would have the effect of
preventing the court from concluding, as it didin Prudhomme and
Misener, that the state privilege against self-incrimination provided
greater protection than the analogous privilege in the United States
Constitution.378 Next, the drafters created a discovery scheme
providing the prosecution with broad discovery rights.3 79 Finally,
the drafters amended the state constitution to specifically mandate
30
reciprocal discovery in criminal trials.
Justice Mosk contended this three part plan was designed to do
more than simply overrule Prudhomme and Misener, it was
designed to abrogate the state constitutional privilege against selfincrimination as a privilege independent of its federal constitutional
counterpart. 38 1 Nevertheless, Justice Mosk claimed that the
drafters' goal was not achieved, since the amendment to section 24,
which would have prohibited California courts from construing the
California Constitution as providing greater rights than afforded by
the United States Constitution, was struck down in Raven.38 2
Justice Mosk rejected the notion that the enactment of section
30(c), which mandated reciprocal discovery, could by itself achieve

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Izazaga, 54 CaL 3d at 398, 815 P.2d at 332, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id (Mosk, L, dissenting).
Id (Mosk, J., dissenting).
let (Mosk, L, dissenting).
1& (Mosk, J., dissenting).

379. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting).
380. Id at 398, 815 P.2d at 333, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
381. Id at 398, 815 P.2d at 332, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mask
pointed to the language of Penal Code section 1054.6 which referred only to privileges under the
United States Constitution, as support for the proposition that the drafters believed that they had
abrogated the state self-incrimination privilege as separate from that guaranteed under the federal
constitution. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting).
382. let at 399, 815 P.2d at 333, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Mask, L, dissenting).
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the drafters' goal.383 In the absence of the amendment to section
24, section 30(c) could not, expressly or implicitly, abrogate the
state privilege against self-incrimination. 3 According to Justice
Mosk, the mandate of reciprocity under section 30(c) did not
conflict with the state privilege against self-incrimination, since the
decisions in Prudhomme and Misener had recognized that some
discovery by the prosecution would be permissible.8 5
Nonetheless, Justice Mosk concluded that the discovery allowed
under California Penal Code section 1054.3 would necessarily aid
the prosecution in proving its case-in-chief, and therefore, violated
the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 8 6
E. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Broussard
Justice Broussard contended that the broad discovery scheme
enacted by Proposition 115 could not withstand a federal
constitutional challenge under the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, or a challenge based on the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. 8 7 Justice Broussard
believed the majority's reading of federal precedent, especially
Williams and Nobles, to be misguided.3 8 Justice Broussard stated
that the scope of discovery under Proposition 115 was much
broader than the discovery approved by United States Supreme
Court in these cases.389
1. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination Under the United
States Constitution
Justice Broussard claimed that the majority mistakenly seized
on the acceleration of disclosure theory presented in Williams to

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

IM (Mosk, J., dissenting).

Xd
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 399-400, 815 P.2d at 333, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
at 400, 815 P.2d at 334, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
at 401, 815 P.2d at 334-35, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
at 402, 815 P.2d at 335, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Broussard, ., dissenting).
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
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uphold the validity of the required disclosures under Penal Code
section 1054.3 in the face of a fifth amendment challenge.3 The
majority had reasoned that because section 1054.3 applied only to
those witnesses and information which the defendant intended to
call at trial, the section merely required a permissible acceleration
of disclosure.3 9' Justice Broussard, however, would not interpret
Williams so broadly as to permit any and all situations where a
disclosure was accelerated. 39 The Brooks v. Tennessee393 case,
decided after Williams, was cited by Justice Broussard for the
proposition that not all accelerated disclosure is constitutionally
valid.394
In Brooks, the United Supreme Court struck down a state rule
of criminal procedure which required a defendant to testify as the
first defense witness or not at all.395 Justice Broussard argued that
after the Brooks decision, a court was required to evaluate any
forced acceleration of disclosure by balancing the state's purpose
for the acceleration against the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination.396
In order to show that Brooks, rather than Williams should be
the controlling precedent in Izazaga's case, Justice Broussard
distinguished the interests at stake in Williams from those at stake
under section 1054.3 disclosures." In Williams, the disclosure of
alibi defenses and witnesses did not create a situation where the
defendant would be providing incriminating evidence or evidence
398
which would aid the prosecution in building its case-in-chief.
In contrast, discovery under section 1054.3 would, by its very
nature, lead to the disclosure of evidence that could aid the

390. Id. at 402-03, 815 P.2d at 335-36, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
391. Id (Broussard, J., dissenting).
392. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
393. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
394. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 403, 815 P.2d at 336, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
395. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612.
396. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 403-04, 815 P.2d at 336, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
397. Id. at 404-05, 815 P.2d at 337, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
398. Id (Broussard, I., dissenting).
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prosecution in building its case.3 Therefore, Justice Broussard
concluded that discovery under section 1054.3, in so far as it
required a defendant to disclose more than alibi defenses and
witnesses, would be a violation of a defendant's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.'
2. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
While Justice Broussard reluctantly agreed with the majority
that the compelled discovery of investigative materials prepared by
the defendant's attorney and investigators would not violate the
fifth amendment, 1 he believed such compelled action raised
serious questions with regard to the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment.' Unlike the
majority, Justice Broussard contended that compelling the
disclosure of witnesses' statements before the trial would have a
chilling effect on the defense, and might negatively influence the
defense counsel's decision to fully investigate all possible
witnesses.' 3
Justice Broussard noted that although the main focus of the
Nobles decision related to the work product doctrine, the Court in
Nobles also addressed the defendant's claim that disclosure of an
attorney's investigative materials violated the sixth amendment,

399. Id. at 405, 815 P.2d at 337, 285 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice
Broussard stated that the relative safety of disclosing alibi defenses stands in direct contrast to other
forms of pretrial discovery, which will necessarily lead to the disclosure of incriminating evidence.
Id (Broussard, J., dissenting). For example, a defendant who anticipates calling a witness to testify
that the defendant committed a homicide in self-defense, is faced with the choice of providing the
prosecution with perhaps the sole witness to the killing or foregoing the use of the witness if the
defendant wishes to test the state's ability to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
400. IL at 406, 815 P.2d at 338 285 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
401. L (Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard stated that the majority had correctly cited
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Nobles for the proposition that the self-incrimination
privilege applied only to testimonial disclosures by the defendant, Id (Broussard, J., dissenting). The
Justice stated, however, that he preferred the interpretation presented in Justice Black's dissent in
Wiliams, which indicated that disclosures by a defense attorney or investigator could potentially
violate the fifth amendment. l (Broussard, J., dissenting).
402. Id (Broussard, J., dissenting).
403. l at 406-07, 815 P.2d at 338, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Broussard, L, dissenting).
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independent of the work product doctrine.' Justice Broussard
stated that although the Supreme Court found no violation in the
Nobles case, the Court treated the claim seriously. 4 5 It was
because the defendant in Nobles had waived his sixth amendment
rights, and because of the limited and conditional nature of the
ordered discovery, that the Court found no violation. 4°6 Justice
Broussard noted that the discovery order in Nobles did not go so
far as to allow the broad type of pretrial disclosures required under
Penal Code section 1054.3./' In Nobles, the discovery order was
limited to reach only relevant portions of the investigator's report,
and only after the defense investigator had testified about the
contents of the report at the trial. 8 Justice Broussard found it
disingenuous to consider the "intends to introduce at trial"
limitation applicable under Penal Code section 1054.3, as
equivalent to the limitation which was the basis for the holding in
Nobles.' Moreover, in the typical criminal prosecution, the
discovery provisions of Chapter 10 will not include a waiver as in
Nobles.4 0 There is a strong possibility that prior to the trial, the
defense would intend to introduce a piece of evidence, but decide
later not to introduce that evidence. 41 ' Therefore, unless the
evidence is actually used at trial, there could be no valid
waiver. 4" The ultimate effect of the California discovery scheme,
according to Justice Broussard, was to tie the defense attorney's
hands, and thereby impermissibly impinge on the defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel under the sixth
amendment." 3

404.

Id. at 408, 815 P.2d 339, 285 Cal. Rptr. t 266 (Broussard, J., dissenting).

405.

Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).

406.

Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Id. at 408, 815 P.2d at 339-40, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67 (Broussard, L, dissenting).
Id. at 409, 815 P.2d at 340, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 267 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Id. at 409, 815 P.2d at 340, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 267 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Id. (Broussard, 3., dissenting).
Id. at 410, 815 P.2d at 340-41, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

A. The Legitimacy of ReciprocalDiscovery in Criminal Trials
1. The Search for Truth Model is the Appropriate Model to
Follow in Criminal Trials
In determining the validity of California's reciprocal discovery
scheme in Izazaga, the California Supreme Court was guided by
the search for truth approach. 14 The court claimed that Chapter
10 effectively reopened the two-way street of discovery in criminal
trials.41 Moreover, the court stated that prosecutorial discovery
is a legitimate demand of the criminal justice system which is
aimed at promoting the orderly ascertainment of truth.41 6 The
question remains, however, whether the adoption of the search for
truth approach is appropriate. 7 The clear answer is yes.4"

414. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing the search for truth approach).
415. Id at 363, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
416. Id at 379, 815 P.2d at 320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 247. The court in making this statement
quoted language from Justice Traynor's opinion in Jones. Id Justice Traynor was an outspoken
proponent of prosecutorial discovery based on the underlying rationale that a criminal trial should
be a search for the truth. See Traynor, supra note 27, at 228 (arguing that the adversarial system's
primary goal should be determining the truth).
417. The search for truth model is not uniformly accepted as the appropriate model for guiding
the proper adversarial balance in criminal trials. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text
(identifying the rival fair play model and its proponents).
418. See M. GRAHAM, TIGHTENwo THE REINs Op JusrIcE IN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN ENoLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 242-49 (1983)
(stating that if the our criminal justice system is not conducted as a search for truth, and if the
dominance of advantages provided to defendants under fair play theory is not curtailed, the system
will continue to inadequately respond to crime). Even if the fair play approach were to be universally
accepted, its application would not necessarily invalidate discovery by the prosecution. The model
is premised on the belief that a defendant's procedural advantages may not be reduced or eliminated
without altering the traditional adversarial balance, a balance which is necessary to ensure the
protection of constitutional rights. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (discussing the fair
play model). It must be remembered, however, that the traditional adversarial balance which existed
when fifth and sixth amendment rights became applicable to the states was a far cry from the balance
that existed when prosecutorial discovery was first introduced. The traditional advantages given to
a defendant were developed in the absence of the defendant's right to discovery. See supranotes 4448 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that neither the defense nor the prosecution were
permitted discovery rights at common law). By allowing the defendant the right to discover the
prosecution's information, the traditional balance was tipped in favor of the defendant. A strong
argument can be made under the fair play approach that allowing reciprocal discovery by the
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The merit of adopting a search for truth approach in criminal
trials is supported by analogy to its use in civil trials. The approach
is widely accepted in the context of civil litigation. 4 9 Liberal
discovery by both parties is rarely questioned.42 The adversarial
clash between parties possessing equal information is widely
considered to be the best means of arriving at the truth. 421 Of
course, civil and criminal trials seek to achieve different aims.422
Accepting, however, that the search for truth approach is
appropriate for civil trials, it is even more germane when applied
in the criminal context. The primary aim of a civil trial is to
resolve a dispute between two private individuals. Society as a
whole is unconcerned with discovering the actual truth behind the
dispute. 41 If the discord can be resolved, regardless of whether
the truth is ever known, the system has achieved its purpose of
settling disputes in a peaceful and orderly fashion.
Conversely, discovering the actual truth is essential in a
criminal trial. A primary function of the criminal justice system is
to punish those who commit wrongs against society.424 Society

prosecution does little more than restore the original adversarial balance. The following statement of
the eminent jurist Learned Hand provides a cogent argument for preventing the fair play approach
from unduly burdening the criminal justice system:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage... Our dangers do not
lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the
archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the
prosecution of crime.
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 ($.D.N.Y. 1923).
419. See Traynor, supra note 27, at 228 (indicating that the search for truth approach has
gained general acceptance in civil litigation).
420. See Brooks-Bey v. Reid, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (No. 91-2726)
(stating that the rule of liberal discovery in civil cases has long been accepted).
421. See Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 121 (stating that the most commonly held view is that
the adversary system is the best means for discovering the truth in a criminal trial).
422. See Comment: Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:
JurisdictionalPrinciplesfor Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L REv. 893, 907 (1984) (indicating that
although elements of the criminal and civil justice systems overlap, the goals of the systems are
different).
423. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Productionoflnformation, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309, 359-60 (stating that the efforts of civil litigants
to influence the outcome of their dispute does not benefit society).
424. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNI HING CRIMINA S 3-7 (1975) (identifying the criminal justice
system's role in administering punishment).
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absolutely refuses to punish an accused unless the accused has been
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.4 '5 Guilt or innocence is
impossible to establish unless the actual truth is known. Although
there is technically a dispute between the accused and the state, it
is not the same type as is found between litigants in the civil
setting." The state has an obligation to prosecute wrongdoers,
but it also has a duty to protect the innocent from being
be accomplished when
convicted.427 These twin aims cannot
423
exists.
truth
actual
the
doubt about
The indispensable role of the search for truth approach in
criminal trials is supported by the United States Supreme Court's
continual reliance upon the approach in deciding the
constitutionality of state discovery rules.429 For example, in
Williams the Court noted that reciprocal discovery rules, because
they aim to promote the search for truth, are consistent with the
goals of our criminal justice system.43" According to the Williams
Court, there is no absolute right to conceal information from
431
discovery, because the adversary system is not an end in itself.

425. See Arenella, supra note 35, at 198 (identifying that our system of justice prefers an
erroneous acquittal to an erroneous conviction).
426. See Zacharias, Structuringthe Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice:Can Prosecutorsdo
Justice?, 44 VAjD. L REv. 45, 46 (1991) (pointing out that attorneys in civil litigation take on the
sole role of aggressive advocate, while prosecutors in criminal cases have an ethical duty to act as
ministers of justice).
427. See ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 31.1(c) (1979) (requiring the prosecution to ensure justice, and not merely seek convictions).
428. The search for truth approach also furthers the deterrent function of the criminal justice
system. Markman, Foreword: The 'Truth in CriminalJustice' Series, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 425,
428 (1989). If criminals perceive that the system is incapable of ascertaining the truth, they will be
emboldened in their belief that they can escape punishment under the system. l
429. For cases identifying the importance of a search for truth approach see, e.g., Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1988); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1975);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970). The value of a search for truth approach has also
been espoused by the California courts. See Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 622, 522 P.2d
681, 684, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 124 (1974) (stating that the search for truth is essential in the
administration of the criminal justice system).
430. Williams, 399 U.S. at 82. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1038 (stating that the Williams
Court based its decision on the search for truth model).
431. Williams, 399 U.S. at 82. See Evans, 11 Cal. 3d at 622,522 P.2d at 684,114 Cal. Rptr.
at 124 (stating that when the adversary system comes in conflict with the ultimate goal of discovering
the truth, the system must yield to that goal).
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The potency of the Court's commitment to the pursuit of truth is
clear from the following language in United States v. Nixon:432
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in
which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to

develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental
and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if

judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation
of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depends on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is

done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process
be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
4 33

prosecution or by the defense.

In addition to the Supreme Court's acceptance of the search for
truth model, the mainstream of American states have enacted
reciprocal discovery provisions which foster the ascertainment of
truth . 41 While it may be impossible to prove that these state
legislatures intended to adopt the search for truth rationale, 435 it
is difficult to reach any other conclusion.436 Reciprocal discovery

432. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
433. Id. at 709.
434. See, e.g., Aiuz. R. Cium. P. 15.2(a)-(t); ARK. P- CRlM. P. 18.3; CoLO. R. CuM. P. 16 part
II; HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(c); ILL. S. Cr. R. CRlM. P. 413(d); MAss. R. CRM. P. 14; MINN. R. CraM.
P. 9.02; Mo. R. COIM. P. 25.05; VT. R. CraM. P. 16.1; WASH. SutER. Cr. CAtM. R. 4.7(b) (providing
for reciprocal pretrial discovery in criminal cases).
435. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (stating that it is difficult or
impossible to determine the subjective intent of a group of legislators). See also Dickerson,
Symposium: The Legislative Process:Statutory Interpretation:Dipping Into Legislative History, 11
HolsTRA L Ray. 1125, 1133 (1983) (stating that legislative actions result from disparate purposes
which are impossible to deterine).
436. There is a possible alternative explanation for the enactment of reciprocal discovery
statutes. The development of discovery by the defense occurred prior to the development of
prosecutorial discovery. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the development
of discovery for the defense and the prosecution respectively). Thus, for a time, the traditional
adversarial balance between the defense and the prosecution was skewed in favor of the defendant.
Therefore, some commentators believed that expanded prosecutorial discovery was required to restore
the original adversarial balance. Louisell, supra note 43, at 99; Traynor, supra note 27, at 246. Even
if this was the motivation behind the enactment of reciprocal discovery rules, it does not negate the
validity of the search for truth approach. By increasing the information discoverable by both parties,
reciprocal discovery provisions necessarily diminish a defendant's ability to conceal information from
the state. If the states had been motivated by something other than the search for truth model (i.e.
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was developed primarily to enhance the quest for truth 437 By its
very nature, reciprocal discovery increases both the prosecution's
and the defense's access to factual information.438 Moreover, the
search for truth model is premised on the theory that greater access
to information will lead to the eventual attainment of truth.4 39
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the pursuit of truth is at the
foundation of the criminal discovery provisions in the mainstream
American jurisdictions.
The Izazaga court's application of the search for truth principle
is further legitimized by the fact that the California Constitution
implicitly commands such an approach. Article I, section 30 of the
Constitution states that discovery in criminal trials shall be
reciprocal in nature.' 0 As previously noted, reciprocal discovery
is grounded upon the search for truth rationale." Moreover, the
meaning of section 30 cannot be defined properly unless read in
conjunction with the preamble to the proposition which enacted the
section. The preamble clearly illustrates that section 30 was enacted
to ensure that California criminal courts pursue the search for
truth." 2
The California Supreme Court was on solid ground in applying
a search for truth approach in Izazaga. First, the approach is an
essential component in achieving the policies underlying a criminal
trial. Second, the United States Supreme Court has deemed the

the fair play model), they could have attempted to restore the original adversarial balance by

restricting defense discovery, not by opening up prosecutorial discovery.
437. See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 60,372 P.2d 919,921,22 Cal. Rptr. 879,881
(1962) (stating that the ascertainment of truth was fostered by discovery which operates as a two-way
street).
438. See supra note 4 (discussing reciprocal discovery).
439. Bandes, supra note 22, at 1037.
440. CAL CoNsT. art. I, § 30.
441. See supra note 27-90 (discussing the relationship between the search for truth approach
and the development of prosecutorial discovery).
442. See Preamble of ProposedLaw, in CALIFORNA BALLOT PAMPHLET 33 (June 5, 1990),
reprinted in CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.1, note (Deerings Supp. 1992) (reprinting section 1(b) of the
preamble of Proposition 115) (stating that the constitutional amendments enacted under the
proposition are designed to restore the California criminaljustice system's proper function as a means
of discovering the truth).
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approach appropriate." 3 Third, a majority of states have followed
the approach.4445" Finally, the approach is rooted in the California
Constitution.

2. Reciprocal Discovery Under Chapter 10 Does Not Violate
A Defendant's ConstitutionalRights
A majority of the California Supreme Court in Izazaga held
that the discovery provisions in Chapter 10 of the Penal Code are
facially valid."' The provisions do not violate a criminal
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 47 right to due
process of the law,44 right to effective assistance of counsel, 449
or protections under the work product doctrine. 450 The Izazaga
holdings are difficult to refute.

443. See supra note 429 (listing Supreme Court cases which have identified the relevance of
the search for truth approach).
444. See supra note 434 (listing criminal discovery statutes based on the search for truth
approach).
445. Preamble of Proposed Law, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMHLT 33 (June 5, 1990),
reprintedin CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.1, note (Deerings Supp. 1992) (stating that the constitutional
amendments enacted under the proposition are designed to restore the California criminal justice
system's proper function as a means of discovering the truth).
446. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 383, 815 P.2d 304, 322, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231,
249 (1991). Butsee CRviE Vxcrims JusnTcn RFORM AcT 1990,.Join Hearingof the Senate Comm.
on Judiciaryandthe Assembly Comm. on PublicSafety, at 88 (staff analysis) (predicting that section
1054.3 of the California Penal Code would violate the United States Constitution because the section
permits broader discovery than allowable under Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 16(b) and United
States Supreme Court cases).
447. See supra notes 229-270 and accompanying text (discussing the Izazaga court's
disposition of the self-incrimination issue).
448. See supra notes 311-352 and accompanying text (discussing the Izazaga court's
disposition of the due process issues).
449. See supra notes 271-293 and accompanying text (discussing the Izazaga court's
disposition of the sixth amendment issue).
450. See supra notes 294-310 and accompanying text (discussing the Izazaga court's
disposition of the work product issue).
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a. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is not an absolute
privilege.45 ' The United States Supreme Court has utilized a
balancing approach to test the validity of procedural rules which
infringe upon the privilege.452 Policies underlying the privilege
are weighed against a state's need to infringe upon the
privilege.4 3 The Supreme Court's application of this balancing
approach in the Williams and Brooks decisions created polar bench
marks, which function as guides for determining the
constitutionality of a criminal discovery statute.454 Therefore,
whether or not a reciprocal discovery statute violates the privilege
against self-incrimination will likely depend upon whether it is
more closely analogous to the statute in Williams or the statute in
Brooks. The disagreement between the majority and Justice
Broussard in Izazaga exemplifies the critical impact of analogizing
to one case or the other. The majority found the discovery
mandated under Penal Code section 1054.3 to be analogous to the
discovery provision in Williams, and therefore constitutional.4 5
Justice Broussard, on the other hand, found it analogous to the rule

451. See supra notes 229-270 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of the privilege
against self-incrimination). See also Dolinko, Is There A Rationale For The PrivilegeAgainst SelfIncrimination?,33 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1147 (1986) (stating that the development of the privilege
against self-incrimination can be explained by history, but cannot be justified either functionally or
conceptually).
452. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing approach used
by the United States Supreme Court).
453. IdM
454. Compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,79-86 (1970) (holding that a statute requiring
the pretrial disclosure of alibi defenses and witnesses did not violate a defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination) with Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 606-12 (1972) (holding that a statute
requiring the defendant to testify before any other defense witness, if the defendant was to testify at
all, violated a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination). Although the Tennessee statute in
Brooks was not technically a discovery statute, the policy considerations underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination that were addressed in Brooks can be applied when determining the
constitutionality of a criminal discovery statute. See Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 40306, 815 P.2d 304,336-38, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231,263-65 (1991) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Brooks decision should be relied upon as controlling precedent for determining the constitutional
validity of criminal discovery statutes).
455. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 367, 815 P.2d at 310-11, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
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in Brooks, and therefore unconstitutional." 6 As discussed below,
the discovery provisions under Chapter 10 are much more closely
analogous to the constitutional statute in Williams than the
unconstitutional statute in Brooks.
The discovery mandated by Chapter 10, unlike the rule in
Brooks, is not adverse to the. policies underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination. In Brooks, the defendant challenged a
Tennessee rule which required the defendant to testify as the first
defense witness if the defendant was to testify at all. 4 7 The
Brooks Court held that the rule unconstitutionally burdened the
defendant's right to choose between testifying or remaining
silent.458 The Court noted that the defendant was faced with a
severe hardship in making such a choice, because of the type of
evidence which becomes admissible upon the defendant's choice to
testify.459 First, the decision to take the stand subjects the
defendant to thorough cross-examination. Such cross-examination
forces the defendant into a position of being faced with either
answering the direct question of whether or not he or she
committed the offense, or committing perjury. Shielding the
defendant from this "cruel trilema of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt" is the primary purpose of the fifth amendment
privilege.46° Next, evidence of the defendant's prior convictions
becomes admissible for impeachment purposes. 461 Such evidence
is potentially devastating, even though unrelated to the charged
offense. Finally, when the defendant testifies, the prosecution may
introduce incriminating evidence obtained in violation of the
defendant's Miranda462 rights.463

456.

Id at 406, 815 P.2d at 338, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Broussard, L, dissenting).

457. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 606.
458. Id at 609.
459. lIa
460. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964) (characterizing a defendant's
choices and stating that the privilege against self-incrimination reduces the hardship of such choices).
461. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 788, 1101(c) (West 1966 & Supp.
1992) (permitting the use of prior bad acts for impeachment purposes).
462. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The United States Supreme Court in Miranda
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is fully applicable during any custodial interrogation,
and that prior to any such interrogation an accused must be given a specic statement of his or her
rights in order for statements made during the interrogation to be admissible in a subsequent trial.
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It is critical to note that all of these concerns are unique to the
testimony of the defendant, and therefore weigh heavily upon the
policies underlying the privilege. 4" These concerns, however, are
not implicated by the disclosure of third-party witnesses and their
statements as required under Chapter 10. In fact, the defendant is
immunized from providing his or her own statement, or even
disclosing whether or not he or she will testify.4o It is true that
the requirements of Chapter 10 may present the defendant with a
difficult choice, disclose the witness or do not put the witness on
the stand. Yet, the Supreme Court has found no constitutional
barrier forbidding difficult choices.4"
Unlike the rule in Brooks, the disclosure of intended witnesses
does not subject the defendant to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury, or contempt. The forced disclosure of any
known witness might. Chapter 10, however, protects the defendant
from self-accusation in that the defendant need not disclose the
names or statements of any witnesses whom the defendant believes
would be incriminating. The defendant need only disclose those
witnesses he or she intends to call at trial.467 Moreover, Chapter
10 discovery does not open the door to the introduction of prior
Id at 444. See generally Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A HistoricalPerspective,24 AM. CRiM. L.
REv. 193 (1986) (discussing the Mirandadecision and its impact on the law of pretrial interrogation).
463. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226
(1971). The Hass and Harris cases held that a confession obtained in violation of a defendant's
Miranda rights, but otherwise voluntary, may be used to impeach the defendant's testimony if the
defendant takes the stand, even though such a confession is not admissible in the prosecution's casein-chief. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris,401 U.S. at 226.
464. It is clear that a defendant's right to present or withhold his or her own testimony is
afforded almost absolute protection, unlike the right to present third-party testimony. For example,
in Brooks the Court held that the exclusion of the defendant's testimony as a sanction for refusing
to testify first was an unconstitutional infringement upon the defendant's right to testify personally.
Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612. The exclusion of a third-party witness's testimony, however, has been
squarely upheld as a valid sanction. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 (1988).
465. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(a) (West Supp. 1992) (specifically excluding the
defendant from those witnesses who, together with their statements, must be disclosed).
466. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (stating that the criminal justice
system is replete with situations where a defendant is faced with difficult choices as to which course
to follow). In fact, in McGautha the defendant was tried under a unitary system where the questions
of guilt and punishment were decided in the same proceeding. Id at 213. Therefore, the defendant
faced an extremely difficult choice, either subject himself to cross-examination in the guilt phase, or
completely forgo the right to speak on his own behalf in the penalty phase. Id.
467. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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bad acts of the defendant.46 Finally, the discovery of third-party
witnesses under Chapter 10 does not provide the prosecution with
the opportunity to utilize illegally obtained statements of the
4
defendant. 6
Not only is the rule in Brooks distinguishable because of its
direct conflict with fifth amendment policies, the state's interest in
compelling the defendant to testify first is far less substantial than
the interests at stake under Chapter 10. The stated purpose of the
Tennessee rule in Brooks was to prevent defendants from falsely
conforming their testimony to that of other witnesses. 4 While
preventing testimonial influence may be an important interest,471
the rule in Brooks was poorly suited to achieve its purpose.
Defendants testify after the prosecution's case-in-chief, at which
point they have heard the primary evidence which they would need
to counter if they chose to commit perjury. Moreover, it is unlikely
that defense witnesses testifying prior to a defendant would reveal
information not already uncovered by the defense's investigation
of its own witnesses.
The questionable significance, and the utter ineffectiveness of
the Tennessee rule stands in stark contrast to the fundamental
interests well served by reciprocal discovery under Chapter 10. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that pretrial discovery, like
cross-examination, reduces the hazard that a final judgment will be
based on incomplete, misleading, or intentionally false
testimony. 472 The Supreme Court has also stated that discovery
rules are a salutary development which promote the fairness of the
criminal justice system by increasing the evidence available to each

468. Only if the defendant chooses to testify will the prosecution be allowed to introduce
evidence of prior conduct. CAL. Evw. CODE § 1101(a) (West Supp. 1992). Even then, such evidence

is limited to impeachment use. Ma§ 788 (West 1966).
469. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 309 (1990) (holding that the prosecution may not use
illegally obtained evidence to impeach defense witnesses other than the defendant).
470. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 607 (1972).
471. The Court in Brooks expressed doubt that the state even regarded the expressed interest
as more than minimally important. l at 611 n.7. The Court indicated that the state's expressed

interest must not be substantial since the state allowed the rule to be waived by the prosecution. Il
472.
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party.473 Not only is Chapter 10 expressly designed to achieve
such legitimate goals, it is also designed to reduce the detrimental
effects of trial delays.47 4
Consistent with what the United States Supreme Court
considers a legitimate goal of criminal trials, the Chapter 10
discovery provisions are designed to enhance the ascertainment of
truth;475 the provisions effectively facilitate this goal. Mandating
pretrial discovery of relevant information ensures that illuminating
facts will not escape the record upon which the trier of fact must
base its verdict. The discovery provisions are also designed to
reduce trial time by avoiding the necessity for frequent
interruptions and delays.4 76 The provisions accomplish this goal
by greatly reducing the need for granting continuances. Pretrial
access to the names, addresses, and statements of witnesses
intended to be used during the trial forecloses the need to delay a
trial in order to permit counsel to investigate a surprise witness
prior to cross-examination.
The legitimate state interests in discovering the truth and
preventing unnecessary and costly delays that characterize the
Chapter 10 discovery provisions are the same interests served by
the notice-of-alibi rule upheld in Williams.477 The Court in
Williams found that the notice-of-alibi rule fostered the
ascertainment of truth by ensuring both the state and the defense
478
ample opportunity to investigate the crucial facts of the case.
Chapter 10 is designed to provide just such opportunity for
thorough pretrial investigation.

473. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
474. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054(c) (West Supp. 1992). The state's substantial interest in
increasing the efficiency of criminal trials was not an interest served by'the rule in Brooks. Moreover,
Chapter 10 is designed to protect victims and witnesses from danger, harassment, and undue delay
in the proceedings. Id § 1054(d) (West Supp. 1992). These interests were also not served by the rule
in Brooks.
475. Id §1054(a) (West Supp. 1992).

476.

Id § 1054(c) (West Supp. 1992).

477. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970) (discussing the state interests served
by a notice-of-alibi statute).
478. Id at 82.
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Moreover, the Williams Court held that the notice-of-alibi rule
did not impermissibly infringe upon the policies underlying the
privilege against self-incrimination." Forcing the defendant to
disclose alibi defenses and witnesses before trial or forgo their use
required the defendant to make a choice.48 The choice, however,
is the same choice the defendant must make during the trial.48 '
The defendant can introduce the evidence and risk incriminating
rebuttal evidence, or choose to withhold the evidence.482 The
Williams Court stated that requiring the defendant to make this
choice before the trial was not contrary to the protections built into
the privilege against self-incrimination.483
The same can be said about the discovery rules under Chapter
10. With respect to the policies underlying the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Chapter 10 rules go no farther than the rule
in Williams. Chapter 10 merely requires the defendant to disclose
before trial that information which the defendant intends to
introduce during the trial.4 Therefore, characterizing Chapter 10
discovery as analogous to the discovery upheld in Williams appears
well founded.
b. The Right to Due Process of the Law
There appeared to be little disagreement among the California
Supreme Court justices that the discovery provisions under Chapter
10 provide a defendant with adequate due process protection.4 5
A detailed examination of the information that the defense and

479.

Id at 82-84.

480.

Id at 84-85.

,481. Id
482. Id.
483. Id
484. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring only the disclosure
of the witnesses and evidence which is intended to be introduced at trial).

'185.

The majority rejected the claim that the discovery provisions violated the defendant's due

process rights. See supranotes 311-352 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's disposition
of the due process claims). Moreover, neither Justice Mosk nor Justice Broussard in their dissenting
opinions questioned the majority's analysis of the due process issues. See supra notes 366-413 and
accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinions of Justice Mosk and Justice Broussard).

1788

1992 / Izazaga v. Superior Court

prosecution, respectively, must disclose under Chapter 10 explains
this lack of disagreement.
In Wardius,the United States Supreme Court stated that the due
process clause does not dictate the amount of discovery which is
permissible in a criminal trial.486 Rather, the clause requires a
certain balance between the discovery rights of the prosecution and
the defense.487 Discovery must be reciprocal in nature, with any
imbalance favoring the defendant.488 The requirement of
reciprocity is also a component of the California Constitution.489
The provisions of Chapter 10 provide for nearly symmetrical
reciprocity, with any imbalance weighted in the defendant's
4
favor. 1
First, California Penal Code section 1054.1(a) states that the
prosecution, upon request, shall disclose the names and addresses
of all persons intended to be called as witnesses.4 91 The
analogous provision applicable to the defense is slightly narrower.
Under section 1054.3(a), the defense must disclose, upon request,
the names and addresses of all persons intended to be called as
witnesses. 4 2 However, this section specifically excludes the
disclosure of the intent to call the defendant.49 a Second, the
prosecution is required under section 1054.1(b) to disclose the
statements of all defendants.494 There is no corresponding duty on
the part of the defense. Third, the prosecution is required to
disclose relevant statements and reports of statements of any
witness intended to be called at trial.4 95 Such disclosure includes
the reports of experts intended to be called, and the results of any

486.

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).

487. Id
488. Id
489. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(c).
490. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 377 n.14, 815 P.2d 304, 313 n.14, 285 Cal.
Rptr. 231,245 n.14 (1991) (describing the provisions as providing near "mirror-image symmetry").
491. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(a) (West Supp. 1992). Although the prosecution must make
full disclosure under section 1054.1(a) to the defense attorneys, the names or addresses of victims
may not be given to the defendant. Id § 1054.2 (West Supp. 1992).
492. Id. § 1054.3(a) (West Supp. 1992).
493. Id
494. Id § 1054.1(b) (West Supp. 1992).
495. Id § 1054.1(f) (West Supp. 1992).
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examinations, tests, or comparisons which are intended to be
introduced.4 The defense has a duty to disclose the same
information, except that the defendant has the advantage of
withholding his or her own statements from discovery even if the
defendant intends to testify.497 Fourth, all relevant real evidence
seized or obtained by the prosecution as part of the investigation
of the charged offense is discoverable by the defense.498 The
prosecution's ability to discover the defense's real evidence is not
so broad. While the prosecution must disclose all real evidence, the
defense is required to disclose only that real evidence which it
intends to introduce at trial.4 Fifth, the prosecution must
disclose the existence of any felony convictions of any material
witness whose credibility is likely to be critical in the trial.5 "0
The defense has no corresponding duty to disclose information
which would be critical in assessing a witness' credibility. Sixth,
the prosecution is compelled to provide the defense with any
exculpatory evidence." 1 The defense, of course, has no duty to
directly disclose incriminating evidence. Finally, the sanctions
which may be utilized to enforce the required disclosure apply
equally to the defense and the prosecution."
The above review of Chapter 10 discovery appears to clearly
indicate that the provisions meet the reciprocity requirements of
Wardius and the California Constitution. 50 3 Nevertheless, a
plausible argument could be made to the contrary. Section 1054.7
of the Penal Code requires the above disclosures be made in
advance of trial, unless good cause can be shown why discovery
should be prohibited.50 4 Allowing a good cause exception, on its
face, does not implicate any due process violation. In fact, the

496.

Itd

497.

Id. § 1054.3(a) (West Supp. 1992).

498.

I& § 1054.1(c) (West Supp. 1992).

499.

Id § 1054.3(b) (West Supp. 1992).

500. Id § 1054.1(d) (West Supp. 1992).
501. Id. § 1054.1(e) (West Supp. 1992).
502.

Id § 1054.5(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1992).

503.

See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of duo

process).
504.
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majority in Izazaga assumed that the provisions relating to timing
of disclosure and the mechanics of enforcement were valid."05
The provision, however, goes on to specifically define what will
constitute good cause.5 6
Good cause is "limited to threats or possible danger to the
safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of
evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law
enforcement." 5 7 Under this definition, it would be seemingly
only the most uncommon scenario that would permit the defense
to meet this test for shielding information from discovery. 508 On
the other hand, there would be frequent situations where the
defense could not discover evidence in the hands of the
prosecution. 5" In such cases, the equal discovery rights mandated
in sections 1054.1 through 1054.6 appear to be effectively tilted in
favor of the prosecution.
The foregoing argument, however, should be rejected. First, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant does not
have an absolute right to discover all witnesses and evidence held
by the prosecution. 1 In Roviaro v. United States,5 12 the Court

505. See Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 374, 815 P.2d 304, 316, 285 Cal. Rptr.
231, 243 (1991) (stating that the enforcement provisions applied equally to the prosecution and
defense), modified,reh'gdenied,54 Cal. 3d 611a (1991). The majority did not, however, specifically
address the validity of the good cause exception as defined in section 1054.7. Id
506. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West Supp. 1992) (defining good cause).
507. Id
508. In order for a defendant to show good cause, the defendant would need to show that
information he or she wishes to exclude from discovery would endanger a victim or witness, or that
it would lead to the destruction of evidence. Id In order to make such a showing the defendant would
have to prove that the information in the hands of the prosecution would in some way threaten
victims or witnesses, or that the prosecution would destroy evidence.
509. It seems as though it would be relatively common that information held by the prosecution
would present a danger to victims and witnesses or lead to the destruction of evidence. For example,
where a defendant is a member of a street-gang, information disclosed by the prosecution would
likely be quickly transmitted to sympathetic gang members who might seek revenge or seek to aid
the defendant by destroying evidence.
510. Such a scenario appears to conflict with the statement in Wardius that "[the State may
not insist that trials be rm as a search for truth so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while
maintaining poker game secrecy for its own witnesses." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475
(1973).
511. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (holding that a defendant does
not have an absolute right to discover the identity of state informants). Cf.Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring the prosecution to disclose any exculpatory evidence).
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stated that the scope of discoverable evidence should be determined
by balancing the public interest in protecting the prosecutor's
information, against the defendant's right to prepare a defense.513
The definition of good cause under Penal Code section 1054.7
merely acknowledges the public interest in preventing the
disclosure of information which threatens victims, witnesses, and
on-going investigations. The section does not ignore the
defendant's side of the balance. It requires the court to make an in
camera review of the claimed good cause before issuing a
protective order."1 4
Moreover, the reciprocity mandated by Wardius is not
necessarily destroyed when the prosecution is able to shield
information by showing good cause. Although section 1054.7 erects
no specific barrier to discovery of defense information upon the
granting of a good cause exception to the prosecution,515 the trial
judge has discretion to do so."' Section 1054.5(c) permits the
court to block a discovery request if required to do so by the
United States Constitution.1 7 Since the due process clause
mandates reciprocally balanced discovery,518 the trial court would
be required, upon a showing of good cause by the prosecution, to
structure any discovery order imposed upon the defense with
corTesponding protection. The apparent lack of reciprocity on the
face of section 1054.7 is just that, apparent. Therefore, it seems
clear that the discovery mandated by Chapter 10 will withstand due
process challenges.

512. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
513. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62.
514. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West Supp. 1992).
515. Section 1054.7 states that information must be disclosed unless good cause is shown. Ra
Moreover, the definition of good cause is expressly limited. L Therefore, it would appear that after
a showing of good cause by the prosecution, the defendant would be unable to escape disclosure

unless the defendant could also make a showing within the limited definition of good cause, Id.
516.
517.
518.

process).
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c. Work Product Protection
The question of whether or not discovery under Chapter 10
impermissibly conflicts with the work product doctrine depends on
whether the doctrine has a constitutional foundation. 1 9 More
precisely, it depends on whether or not ordinary, as opposed to
core, work product is constitutionally protected. Since core work
product is expressly shielded from discovery under Chapter 10,520
no constitutional issue arises. The majority in Izazaga found no
constitutional work product protection. 521 In contrast, Justice
product might be protected under the United
Kennard thought work
5
States Constitution. 1
To support her contention that work product might be protected
under the sixth amendment, Justice Kennard pointed to language in
the Nobles decision. 5 ' According to Justice Kennard, the United
States Supreme Court's characterization of the work product
doctrine as "vital" and "necessary" implies that the protection is
an integral part of the sixth amendment right to counsel. 524 Aside
from this language, Justice Broussard failed to provide any other
that work
authority for her proposition. 51 The better view is 526
discovery.
from
shielded
product is not constitutionally

519. In the absence of a constitutional foundation, work product protection is defined by
statutory and common law. A new statutory provision does not violate older provisions, rather, it
defines the law to the extent of any inconsistency between the old and new provisions. See United
States v. Gooding, 477 F.2d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1973), affd,416 U.S. 430 (1974).
520. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.6 (West Supp. 1992) (excluding core work product from
discovery).
521. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356,381,815 P.2d 304,320-21,285 Cal. Rptr. 231,
247-48 (1991), modified, reh'g denied, 54 Cal. 3d 611a (1991).
concurring).
522. Id. at 386, 815 P.2d at 324, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (Kennard, J.,
523. id at 385, 815 P.2d at 323-24, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51 (Kennard, J., concurring).
concurring).
524. Id. at 385, 815 P.2d at 324, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (Kennard, J.,
525. Id. at 381 n.18, 815 P.2d at 321 n.18, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.18.
526. See Thomburg, Rethinking Work Product,77 VA.L. REv. 1515,1517 (1991) (arguing that
the work product doctrine should be abolished entirely). Even if work product is considered a
constitutionally protected privilege, it is unlikely that discovery under Chapter 10 would be a
violatioa of the privilege. In Nobles, the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege derived
from the work product doctrine is waived when the defense seeks to make testimonial use of the
work product. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 n.14 (1975). The same sort of waiver is
implicit under Chapter 10 discovery. But see Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 409, 815 P.2d at 340, 285 Cal.
dissenting) (claiming that in a typical case there would be no waiver by
Rptr. at 267 (Broussard, J.,
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As the Izazaga majority stressed, it would be difficult to believe
that a doctrine, created in a civil case, is rooted in a constitutional
amendment which is applicable only to criminal defendants. 27
Still, a few authorities have indicated that work product protection
is an integral component of a defendant's sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.52 It is essentially reasoned that
the sixth amendment guarantee can only be meaningfully
implemented if the defendant is secure in knowing that his or her
attorney's trial preparations are free from government
intrusion.529 To support the claimed constitutional protection,
these authorities point to cases holding that it is a constitutional
violation for the prosecution to secretly intrude upon the
preparations of defense counsel. 530 Aside from the obvious factual

the defendant under Chapter 10). Although the waiver in Nobles took place during the trial, and
discovery under Chapter 10 requires pretrial disclosure, the decision in Williams indicates that if a
defendant intends to introduce information at trial, the defendant can constitutionally be compelled
to accelerate his or her disclosure to the pretrial stage. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86
(1970) (holding that requiring pretrial disclosure of alibi defenses intended to be introduced at trial
does not violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination). Chapter 10 requires the disclosure
of only that information which is intended to be introduced at trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3
(West Supp. 1992). In order to find a constitutional violation in accelerating work product
disclosures, one would have to find some reason to regard work product protection as more sacred
than the privilege against self-incrimination. This would seem a dubious proposition at best. See
generally Moore, supra note 45, at 905 (stating that since the prosecution is able to rebut defense
evidence presented at trial, the only difference between rebuttal at trial and anticipatory rebuttal in
the form of pretrial discovery is the element of surprise, and a right to surprise seems unworthy of
constitutional protection).
527. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381 n.18., 815 P.2d at 321 n.18, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.18.
528. United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239,1245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed
Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Pulaski, supra note 132, at 28-29 & nn.155-56.
529. Pulaski, supra note 132, at 28 n.155.
530. See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cer. denied, 349 U.S.
930 (1954); United States v. Coplon, 191 F.2d 749,759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
926 (1952) (finding that secret intrusions upon the defense counsel's trial preparations violate the fifth
and sixth amendments). These cases, however, do not establish a per se constitutional violation for
intrusions by the prosecution. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977) (holding that
government intrusions into confidential attorney-client communications violate the Constitution only
if the prosecution subsequently uses the obtained information against the defendant).
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distinction between a secret intrusion and common pretrial
discovery,53 t the reasoning contains some serious flaws.
First, the claimed sixth amendment protection is premised upon
the defendant actually possessing a constitutional privilege. Work
product protection, however, was originally designed, and has been
continuously characterized as, a privilege of the attorney, not the
client. 532 Next, establishing a per se rule that discovery of work
product violates a defendant's right to effective assistance 533
of
right.
that
interpreting
law
case
existing
to
counsel is contrary
A violation of a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel is not determined by reference to isolated
conduct of the attorney. 5M Rather, the entire record of the
representation must be reviewed in order to determine if the
defendant was denied adequate representation. 535 Moreover,
courts have been unwilling to second-guess an attorney's good-faith
strategies and tactics when evaluating claimed sixth amendment
violations.536
In addition to these theoretical problems with considering work
product protection a constitutional privilege, there is a severe
practical problem. If work product protection is a component of a
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, the attorney
would be unable to waive the protection without the client's

531. Clearly, information secretly obtained by the prosecution would be considerably more
devastating to the defendant's case. Since defense counsel would not know that the prosecution
possessed the information, the defense would not prepare any effective means of countering the
prosecution. This is not the case with open pretrial discovery. By knowing exactly what incriminating
evidence must be rebutted, defense counsel can make preparations to minimize the incriminating
effect of the disclosed evidence.
532. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavnaoz, 487 F.2d 480,483 n.12
(4th Cir. 1973); Cohn, The Work ProductDoctrine:Protection,Not Privilege,71 GEo. LJ. 917,936

(1983) (identifying that work product protection is designed as a protection for the attorney).
533. See Long v. State, 510 S.W.2d 83, 88 (Tenn. 1974); Honagel v. Kropp, 426 F.2d 777,
779 (6th Cir. 1970) (stating that the entire record of representation, as opposed to single acts or

omissions, must be viewed in order to determine if there has been ineffective assistance of counsel).
534. Long, 510 S.W.2d at 88; Holnagel, 426 F.2d at 779.
535. Long, 510 S.W.2d at 88; Holnagel,426 F.2d at 779.
536. Eg., United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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consent.5 37 This would create serious administrative difficulties,
since the client would have to be present any time defense counsel
negotiates with the prosecution.538 Moreover, because voluntary
disclosure of work product is often used as part of a negotiation
strategy,539 constitutional protection for work product might take
strategy decisions out of the attorney's hands, and place a
potentially unschooled defendant in the position of retaining the
ultimate responsibility for making critical strategy decisions."'
Therefore, elevating work product protection to the level of a
constitutional right may ironically lead to an actual reduction in the
effectiveness of representation.
In reality, the work product doctrine is a protection, not a
privilege.541 Moreover, work product is a protection for the
attorney.5 42 The fact that an attorney, without consulting his
client,543 may waive work product protection seems clearly

537. In those cases elevating work product protection to a constitutional privilege, the
protection has been analogized with the attomey-client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell,
372 F. Supp. 1239,1245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (likening work product protection to the attomey-client
privilege). An attorney may not waive the attorney-client privilege in the absence of the client's
consent, Benge v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 336, 344, 182 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (1982). It is,
therefore, logical to assume that an attorney could not waive work product protection without actual
consent from the client. Cf. Cohn, supra note 532, at 936 (stating that traditionally work product has
been considered a protection of the attorney, and therefore, only the attorney can waive the
protection).
538. The prosecution could almost never rely on the defense counsel's assertion that the
defendant had agreed to waive work product protection. Unless the defendant was present or took
extraordinary steps to acknowledge the defendant's consent to the waiver, the prosecution would be
unable to show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was the product of the defendant's
freely expressed choice. Cf Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1976) (requiring clear and
convincing proof for consent to the waiver of sixth amendment rights).
539. Defense counsel will often reveal some of its possible defenses or strategies in order to
convince the prosecution to drop or reduce charges. See Bundy & Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the
Adversary System? A GeneralTheory of LitigationAdvice andIts Regulations, 79 CALW. L. REv.
315, 406 (1991) (stating that the disclosure of work product materials during plea bargain
negotiations is so common that attorneys must force themselves to withhold such information).
540. Wose yet, depending on how the issue of waiver is resolved, a defendant could simply
choose to see if his attorney's disclosure of work product during negotiations proves beneficial. If
it does not, the defendant could then have his case overturned by claiming an invalid waiver of his
sixth amendment right.
541. See Cohn, supranote 532, at 943 (characterizing work product as a protection rather than
as a privilege).
542. Id.
543. See Ud.at 936-38 (discussing the waiver of work product protection).
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contradictory to the assertion that the protection is a defendant's
constitutional right.
The work product doctrine was designed to maintain the
adversarial nature of our civil justice system in the wake of the
development of liberal pretrial discovery.544 To be sure, the
propriety of the strict adversarial system is subject to
challenge. 545 Accepting, however, that a strict adversarial clash
is desirable in civil cases, does not lead to the conclusion that
absolute work product protection is appropriate in criminal
cases.546 Criminal trials have never been strictly adversarial.547
In the criminal setting, the discovery of the truth is vital, and
therefore a more inquisitorial approach has been adopted.5 ' Since
the work product doctrine was designed to protect the adversarial
nature of a civil trial, and since a strict adversarial approach is
inappropriate in criminal trials, work product protection should not
be expanded to the level of a constitutional privilege.
d. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel
Closely related to Justice Kennard's belief that the Chapter 10
discovery provision might run afoul of the work product doctrine,
is Justice Broussard's contention that the discovery provisions
violated a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance

544. See Waits, Work ProductProtection For Witness Statements: Time ForAbolition, 1985
WIs. L REv. 305, 306-07 (1985) (explaining the historical reasons for the development and
maintenance of the work product doctrine).
545. See id. at 337-40 (claiming that the adversary system is not above reproach, and pointing
out the flaws in a strict adversarial approach).

546.

Butsee Stern, PrivilegedInformers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem anda Proposalfor

Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1841 (1988) (arguing that work product in the criminal setting
should receive greater protection than it is currently afforded).
547. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,231 (1975) (stating that the judiciary has
inherent power to order a party to disclose to the opposing party certain information); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970) (permitting pretrial discovery of a defendant's intended alibi
defenses and witnesses).
548. See Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 128-29 (stating that "[a] criminal trial is both an

investigation and a contest").
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of counsel.5 49 Justice Broussard claimed that by requiring the
disclosure of information gained through the defense's
investigation, defense counsel would be chilled from conducting a
zealous pretrial investigation.55 Contrary to Justice Broussard's
claim, discovery under Chapter 10 does not discourage exhaustive
pretrial investigation, and therefore does not violate a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel.55
It should be noted that fears of chilling pretrial investigation
were strongly voiced when liberal discovery first came into use in
civil trials.552 After many years of experience with liberal civil
discovery, the "chilling" argument has proven unfounded.553 The
argument ignores the realities of trial practice.554 It is based on
the assumption that defense counsel would rather enter a trial with
an incomplete view of the case, than risk discovering incriminating
facts. In order to maximize the chances for success under our
adversarial system, however, an attorney must be prepared to
counter the adversary's evidence. This cannot be accomplished
without thorough pretrial investigation and preparation. The
argument also ignores the powerful incentives compelling attorney
preparation.555 The rules governing professional conduct require

549. Seesupranotes 400-413 and accompanying text (discussingJustice Broussard's dissenting
view that Chapter 10 discovery violates a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel).
550. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 409, 815 P.2d 304, 340, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231,
267 (1991), modified, reh'g denied, 54 Cal. 3d 611a (1991).
551. But see Mosteller, supra note 48, at 1668 (arguing that liberal discovery chills pretrial
investigation to the point of potentially violating the right to effective assistance of counsel).
552. See Waits, supra note 544, at 327-43 (identifying the adverse effects which would follow
in the absence of work product protection). See also Note, Discovery ofan Attorney's Work Product
on Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DuKE L. 799, 807 (1974) (pointing out that the Hickman Court did
not claim that empirical data supported the fears of chilling an attorney's preparation, but merely
assumed such an undesirable effect).
553. See Waits, supra note 544, at 327-43. Professor Waits points out that it may be impossible
to prove that the rationale underlying the work product doctrine is incorrect, but that it is perhaps
more difficult to prove that it is correct. Id at 327. Moreover, Professor Waits provides cogent
arguments which indicate that the abolition of work product protection would not have the negative
effects claimed by proponents of the protection. Id at 327-47.
554. See Wells, TheAttorney Work ProductDoctrineandCarry-Overlmmunity:An Assessment
of Their Justfications,47 U. Prrr. L. RLrv. 675, 684-98 (1986) (claiming that the justifications for
work product protection are, for the most part, invalid).
555. See id. (identifying reasons which motivate trial preparation and do not depend on work
product protection).
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an attorney to always undertake thorough trial preparations."'
Failure to adhere to these rules can lead to sanctions and possible
disbarment,557 as well as opening the door to a malpractice
action."' In addition to the incentives provided by the formal
rules of conduct, informal incentives also ensure an attorney's
diligent trial preparation. It is likely that an attorney would be
stigmatized as incompetent by peers if the attorney failed to
thoroughly prepare for trial on a regular basis. Moreover, an
unprepared attorney will likely lose the great majority of his or her
cases, resulting in a corresponding financial loss.559 Opponents of
pretrial discovery have been unable to cite empirical data which
supports the claimed chilling. 5" In fact, discovery does not
appear to negatively influence an attorney's trial preparation.561
Both the formal and informal incentives to thoroughly prepare for
trial explain why discovery does not chill attorneys. In the absence
of any proof of a chilling effect, and with the experience in civil

556. See MODEL RULES OF CONDUCT Rule 1.1 & comment (1983) (requiring thorough
preparation and investigation of factual and legal elements of a case); Id. Rule 1.3 & comment (1983)
(requiring an attorney to act with reasonable diligence); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
AoMINIsRATIoN OF CRmuNAL JUSTICE § 4-4.1 (1979) (requiring defense counsel to conduct a
prompt and thorough investigation into all facts relevant to the merits of the case); Id, § 4-4.5
(instructing defense counsel to comply in good faith with applicable discovery provisions). See also
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6067 (West 1990) (requiring attorneys to take an oath that they will
discharge their duties to the best of the their knowledge and ability).
557. See CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 6100 (West 1990) (acknowledging the California Supreme
Court's power to discipline, suspend, or disbar an attorney for failing to adhere to the rules of
professional conduct).
558. Private attorneys in California may be held liable for malpractice in both civil and criminal
matters. Briggs v. Lawrence, 230 Cal. App. 3d 605,610-11,281 Cal. Rptr. 578,581 (1991). Whether
or not a public defender may be held liable to a client for malpractice depends on a number of
factors, as well as the statutory requirements under the California Tort Claims Act. See id. at 612-19,
218 Cal. Rptr. at 582-86. (discussing the conditions upon which a public defender may be liable for
malpractice). See also Millich, PublicDefender MalpracticeLiability in Calfornia, 11 WHIIER L.
REV. 535, 536-42 (1989) (discussing the extent to which a public defender may be held liable for
malpractice).
559. A financial loss results because a private attoriney's client base will more than likely be
reduced if the attorney has a reputation for losing the great majority of his or her cases. Even a public
defender has a financial stake in winning cases, in that a consistently unprepared public defender will
find it difficult to hold on to his or her job.
560. See Thomburg, supra note 526, at 1527-29 (pointing out the lack of support for the
argument that pretrial discovery chills an exhaustive preparation).
561. Id
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trials countering such a conclusion, it is difficult to find any sixth
amendment violation inherent in pretrial discovery.
B. Improved Functioning of the CriminalJustice System
Aside from any question about the constitutional validity of
reciprocal discovery,562 it is manifest that broad pretrial
disclosure of evidence improves the functioning of the criminal
justice system."' The overwhelming majority of courts and
commentators agree that the primary function of a criminal trial is
the ascertainment of the truth.5" Moreover, these authorities
recognize that broad discovery provisions are the best way to
uncover the truth that can often be hidden in the myriad of facts
and tactics making up a criminal trial.56 This recognition goes
to the very heart of the American system of justice, the notion that
the truth will emerge from the contest of equally prepared
adversaries. It was the very fact that the adversarial balance in
California criminal trials was skewed too far in favor of the
defendant, that prompted the enactment of Chapter 10."
The reciprocal discovery scheme in Chapter 10 promotes the
ascertainment of the truth. By mandating broad disclosure of
evidence before trial, the scheme provides both parties with the

562. See The Recorder, Mar. 22,1991, at 1 (quoting Lawrence Sullivan, the supervising Deputy
Attorney General in San Francisco, as stating that after the California Supreme Court disposes of the
Izazaga case, there would not likely be further resistance to reciprocal discovery in California
criminal trials).
563. See Clennon, Pre-TrialDiscovery of Witness Lis: A Modest Proposalto Improve the
Administration of CriminalJusticein the SuperiorCourt of the Districtof Columbia, 38 CATH.U.L.
REV. 641, 641 (1989) (stating that adopting rules providing for pretrial discovery will improve the
administration of criminal justice).
564. See W. LAFAVE & 3. IsRAEL, supra note 4, § 19.3(a) (stating that even opponents of
expansive discovery do not deny that a trial should function as a search for the truth). See also Craig
v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 416, 426, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565, 569-70 (1976) (Elkington, J.,
concurring) (stating that the only purpose of a criminal trial is the search for the truth).
565. See, e.g., Schlesinger, The 1976 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture - Comparative
CriminalProcedure:A Plea For Utilizing ForeignExperience,26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361,383 (1977)
(stating that in the absence of broad discovery relevant facts will often remain hidden).
566. See Preamble of Proposed Law, in CALIuomuA BALLOT PAMwHu.Er 33 (June 5, 1990),
reprintedin, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.1, note (Deerings Supp. 1992) (reprinting section 1(a) of the
preamble to Proposition 115) (stating that 'comprehensive reforms are needed to restorethe balance
and fairness to our criminal justice system") (emphasis added).
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opportunity to fully investigate and analyze the facts of the case.
Such thorough pretrial preparation ensures that relevant evidence
illuminating the truth will not be hidden or disregarded. The
provisions under Chapter 10 ensure that the trier of fact will be
presented with the most complete record, and therefore will have
an enhanced opportunity to uncover the actual truth."
Moreover, the new discovery scheme improves the efficiency
of the system by reducing the needless waste of court time and
money."' The criminal courts in California are currently
overwhelmed by the tremendous flow of new cases and the lack of
personnel, time, and space."6 Pretrial reciprocal discovery
reduces the opportunities for surprise defenses and witnesses which
invariably lead to continuances and delay.57 While the nature of
the adversarial system may encourage some gamesmanship and
surprise, such tactics are not necessary for the proper functioning
of the system, nor do these tactics add to the achievement of just
results.
Finally, the reforms adopted under Chapter 10 will increase
respect for the criminal justice system, a system in dire need for

567. See K. WELLs & P. WEsTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND TRIAL PRACTICE 31 (1977)
(stating that the goals of a criminal trial can only be achieved when the trier of fact is presented with
a complete record of the facts from which to make an objective verdict).
568. Millions of dollars are spent on absurd trials, in large part because of unnecessary delays.
CRmiE VicTims JusIcE REFORM ACT 1990, Joint Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Judiciaryand
the Assembly Comm. on Public Safety, at 30. For example in the defense of a single Orange County
murder, the state spent in excess of eight million dollars. Id Moreover, the national average for the
time it takes to complete a felony trial is six months, while in California, the average time is more
than two years. Id
569. In 1988, California superior courts reported 115,595 criminal filings. Il at part I, pg.
5. Although this figure represented only 13% of the total filings, these criminal cases consumed 38%
of the courts' judicial time. Id. The problem of overburdened courts is so severe that it threatens the
criminal justice system. See Schlesinger, supra note 565, at 382 (stating that the problem of
overloaded courts places the criminal justice system on the brink of collapse). See generally Moore,
Courting Disaster,NAT'L J. vol. 22, no. 9, at 502 (1990) (discussing the severe problem of exploding
criminal caseloads).
570. See Schlesinger, supra note 565, at 382 (stating that procedural rules aimed at the
ascertainment of truth tend to expedite criminal proceedings). See generally, ABA Suggested
Guidelinesfor Reducing Adverse Effects of Case Continuance and Delays on Crime Victims and
Witnesses, 1986 A.B.A. SEc. CRIM. JusT. REP. foreword, at iv (indicating that thorough pretrial
preparation is essential to prevent unnecessary continuances and the devastating effect of such
continuances).
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increased respect.571 A large segment of the public currently
believes that the system is unnecessarily expensive, and too often
yields results which are unfair." 2 By increasing the efficiency of
the system, and promoting just results, the discovery provisions
encourage respect for the system. This, in turn, cultivates vital
public support for the system. 73 Such support improves the
functioning of the system in that it not only ensures that the public
will continue to adequately fund the system,574 but also decreases
the likelihood that the public will resort to self-help when
victimized by crime.
It is unquestionably clear that the discovery provisions under
Chapter 10 are a commendable addition to the California Penal
Code. The provisions promote the ascertainment of truth, which
enhances the efficiency of criminal proceedings and achievement
of just results, which, in turn, encourages public support for the
system. The net result is a substantial improvement of the
California criminal justice system.
C. A Remaining Question With Chapter 10 Discovery:
Applicability to Municipal and Juvenile Court Cases
Despite the Izazaga court's rather thorough analysis of the
validity of the discovery provisions in Chapter 10, a question
remains as to the applicability of the provisions in municipal and

571.

See CriminalJustice in Crisis,A.B.A. Report at 50-51 (1988) (report prepared by the

Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society of the American Bar Association Criminal
Justice Section) (stating that statistical surveys indicate that the public generally does not believe the
criminal justice system functions well).
572. See Report to the Attorney Generalon the Search andSeizure ExclusionaryRule, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 573,610-11 (1989) (stating that studies indicate a widespread public perception that
the criminal justice system fails to achieve just results because of a departure from its truth-seeking
function). See also L.A. Tunes, May 15, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (indicating the need for criminal justice
system reform is essential in order to keep the law-abiding public from losing faith in the system).
573. See Paulsen, The Problem of Discovery in Criminal Cases, A.LI. REP. at vi (1961)
(stating that if the criminal justice system fails to command public respect serious social
consequences will result).
574. See Criminal Justice in Crisis, supra note 571, at 50-51 (stating that if the public
continues to lack respect for the system, the public will not support it financially).
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juvenile court cases.5" The question arises because the
disclosures mandated under Chapter 10 are required to be made at
least thirty days prior to the trial.57 6 Defendants in misdemeanor
cases that are held in custody must be brought to trial within thirty
days of arraignment."r Juveniles who are detained by court order
must have their cases heard by the juvenile court within fifteen
days from the time a petition for hearing is filed. 578 Therefore, it
would be impossible to comply with the requirement that disclosure
be made at least thirty days in advance of trial. These apparently
conflicting time requirements have led some practitioners to
conclude that the framers of Chapter 10 did not intend the
discovery provisions to be applied in misdemeanor and juvenile
cases.

579

The timing requirements of Chapter 10, however, need not be
interpreted to exclude the use of the mandated discovery in
municipal or juvenile cases. In addition to setting forth the thirty
day requirement, the provisions further state that if the material and
information required to be disclosed becomes available to a party
within 30 days of trial, disclosure must be made immediately. 80
Clearly, this language gives recognition to those situations where
a party is unable to make the required disclosure thirty days prior

575. The issue was not addressed by the California Supreme Court because Izazaga was
charged with a felony. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356,363, 815 P.2d 304,308,285 Cal.
Rptr. 231, 235 (1991), modified, reh'g denied, 54 Cal. 3d 611a (1991)..
576. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West Supp. 1992).
577. See id. § 1382(A)(3) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring a defendant to be brought to trial within
30 days after arraignment or the entering of a plea, whichever is later).
578. CAL. WEL. & INsT. CODE § 334 (West 1984). Juveniles who are not detained must have
their cases brought before the juvenile court within 30 days from the date of petition. Id.
579. See The Recorder, Mar.22, 1991, at I (quoting the chief of research for the San Francisco
Public Defender's Office as saying that unless the drafters of Proposition 115 were being nonsensical,
the discovery provisions were not intended to be applicable to misdemeanor or juvenile cases). With
respect to juvenile cases, the claim that the drafters did not intend Chapter 10 to apply may have
some validity. The California Rules of Court establish a specific set of procedures governing pretrial
discovery in juvenile cases. CAL. Juv. Cr. R. 1420(a)-(k) (West Supp. 1991). In addition to being
tailored to meet the specific needs of juvenile cases, the court rules provide for rather liberal
reciprocal discovery, much like that mandated under Chapter 10. See id. Therefore, it is possible that
the drafters of Proposition 115 did not believe the mandates of Chapter 10 were necessary in the
juvenile court setting.
580. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West Supp. 1992).
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to trial. Misdemeanor or juvenile proceedings are examples of these
situations.
A fair interpretation of the statute is that, in those cases where
a defendant must be brought to trial in less than thirty days, any
mandated discovery under Chapter 10 must be disclosed
immediately upon request. It would seem logical to assume that the
drafters of Chapter 10 set the thirty day restriction in order to give
the party seeking discovery time to thoroughly review the
disclosures and prepare for trial. Permitting a party to hold on to
discoverable materials up to the threshold of a trial would defeat
the purposes behind pretrial discovery. In proceedings which must
be initiated more rapidly, such as municipal and juvenile court
cases, extensive pretrial review of evidence is an unavailable
luxury. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the thirty day
requirement was intended for those cases which are calendared for
more than thirty days in the future, and for all others, disclosure
should be made immediately. It is illogical to assume that the great
value assigned to the policies underlying reciprocal discovery is not
equally applicable in municipal and juvenile court cases.
IV. CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court's decision in Izazaga gave
recognition to the public's demand for a criminal justice system
which operates efficiently and produces just results. By affirming
the validity of the new criminal discovery provisions, the
Izazaga decision is a positive step toward the attainment of the
public's demands.58 To be sure, Izazaga alters the adversarial
balance between the state and an accused. The decision,
however, merely rectifies what was an undue imbalance favoring
the accused. In the process of restoring an equitable adversarial
balance, the decision properly endorses the validity of a search

581. Of course, the decision would be subject to severe criticism if it rested wholly upon public
opinion. It did not. The majority's thoughtful reasoning was grounded upon established precedent.
For a discussion of incorporation of public values in statutory interpretation see generally Eskridge,
Public Values In Statutory Interpretadon. 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989) (discussing the role of
public values in constitutional and statutory interpretation).
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for truth approach in California criminal trials. The decision also
recognizes that reciprocal discovery under Chapter 10 does not
violate a defendant's constitutional rights. Finally, the decision
validates procedural rules which substantially improve the
California criminal justice system.
Steve Holden
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